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Preface
This abstract discussion of conservation 
decisions and of the optimum state of 
conservation does not explain conservation 
and depletion in actual situations of 
resource use. But such a discussion provides 
the organizing principle by which actual 
situations may be understood.
To use an analogy, the concepts of "climax 
type" in ecology and "adaptive peak" in 
genetics do not explain an actual plant 
association or the developmental state of a 
species at a particular time and place; nor 
do they indicate that static states are 
realizable or that the system which is being 
considered is closed. Still they are helpful 
constructs in understanding the direction of 
ceaseless change, the resultant of 
environmental forces which can be observed at 
a given time and place.
Similarly, the optimum state of conservation,
(iv)
both as an ex ante and an ex post concept is 
a construct which is helpful as an organizing 
principle in analyzing the result of economic 
forces which influence conservation and 
depletion. A study of these forces is the 
central theme of the economics of 
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ABSTRACT
RESOURCE USE RATES: ESTIMATION OF TIME
INVARIANT DECISION RULES
By
Douglas John Lawrence 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1987
The Abstract
As interest in soil conservation has increased, 
understanding the soil management decision rule used by 
farmers has become more important. The model developed to 
analyze the optimal decision rule for soil use rates is 
essentially a supply response model which assumes rational 
expectations. It can be characterized as a dynamic optimal 
control model with feedback from decisions to states. Three 
Stage Least Squares estimation is re-interpreted to fit the 
requirements of rational expectations. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that soil conservation policy must 
consider general economic variables as well as traditional 





Concern over the current and future effects of 
water-induced soil erosion on soil productivity has 
increased dramatically over the past decade. For examples 
of this concern see Crosson and Stout (1983); Risser (1978); 
and Bovard (1984). As an outgrowth of this concern a number 
of economic models have been developed: Wade and Heady 
(1977); Forster and Becker (1979); Osteen and Seitz (1978); 
and Taylor and Frohberg (1977). However, the preponderance 
of these models are nonstochastic, static (often linear 
programming) efforts. Even those that have employed more 
sophisticated techniques like optimal control are still 
deterministic. For examples of this work see McConnell 
(1983); Burt (1981); Bhide, Pope and Heady (1982); Clark and 
Furtan (1983); and Collins and Headley (1983). The upshot 
is that past research has had limitations for quantitatively 
addressing the soil erosion problem. More precisely, a 
dynamic model which incorporates uncertainty and the effects 
of exogenous variables is needed to evaluate the behavior of 
farmers and their use of the soil resource.
Decisions concerning the use of soil depend, in part.
-2-
on the decision maker's expectations. During the last 
decade there has been a great deal of research which has 
focused upon the formation of expectations. This research 
is important because expectations form the vital link 
between accumulated information, present decisions and 
future outcomes.
The agricultural economics literature surrounding 
expectations is vast: Askari and Cummings (1977) cite
hundreds of models developed with Nerlovian adaptive 
expectations. However, it was recognized by Muth (1961) 
that such adaptive expectations do not satisfactorily 
describe behavior. Simply put, there is no theory to 
support the speed of adjustment parameters in adaptive 
expectations models. In Muth’s words "...dynamic economic 
models do not assume enough rationality..." (p. 316). In 
short, Muth's concept of rational expectations provides a 
modeling tool that enriches the neoclassical paradigm. This 
enrichment is achieved in two ways: (1) It assumes that
individuals utilize information available to them to make 
decisions (an optimizing of expectations); (2) It forces
the researcher to address explicitly any apparent behavioral 
drag factors, such as costs of adjustment.
Perhaps the best known use of rational expectations is 
associated with the "Lucas Critique" (Lucas 1976). Robert 
Lucas demonstrated that an economic agent's behavior is not 
invariant to changes in policy regiems; thus, the 
reduced-form equation parameters cannot test the effects of
-3-
changes in exogenous variables. Rational expectations has 
been used extensively in various fields within macro­
economics. However, there is another area where rational 
expectations use is growing: resource economics. (See
Eckstein (1984); Rosenman and Whiteman (1983); and Epple, 
Hanson and Roberds (1982).)
This research will take the soil conservation policy 
concerns generated during the last decade and apply recent 
advances in modeling technology found in Whiteman (1983), 
Hansen and Singleton (1982), Hansen and Sargent (1981), 
Hansen and Sargent (1980) , Hansen (1982), Rosenman (1986) , 
and Sargent (1979) to generate a rational expectations model 
of the soil resource. The model will be based on the potato 
production process in Aroostook County, Maine. Aroostook 
County is used for a number of reasons. Since data 
availability is of primary importance and because Aroostook 
County produces virtually all the potatoes grown in Maine, 
any data which is reported only at the state level may be 
relevant. In addition, because the potato industry dominates 
the economy of Aroostook County, important countywide 
variables may be appropriate. Furthermore, because the net 
returns from the companion crop in the potato rotation 
(oats) are essentially zero, it is possible to focus on 
production of a single crop. Finally, Aroostook County has 
been designated by the United States Soil Conservation 
Service (SCS) as a "targeted" area eligible for increased 
federal assistance, both technical and financial, for the
-4-
installation of erosion control practices.
1.1 The Soil Resource
1.1.1 The Nature of Soil
Before specifying a model of the soil resource, it 
will be worthwhile to consider in some detail the physical 
properties of soil. Soils are basically the product of 
biochemical weathering of mineral materials which are best 
described in profile. At the bottom of the profile lies the 
bedrock from which the weathering action developed the soil. 
The bedrock is called parent material. The area above the 
parent material is known as regolith, and its depth and 
characteristics are highly variable. The upper three to six 
feet of the regolith has been extensively weathered and has 
some measure of organic matter, since this is the area where 
plant roots are found. It is this upper biochemically 
weathered zone of the regolith which is conventionally 
identified as soil.
As indicated above, the upper layers of the soil 
profile (or surface soil) contain the highest concentrations 
of organic matter. In fact, five to six percent of the 
surface soil is organic matter. This organic material is 
vitally important in terms of soil productivity. The 
surface soil is the source of a large share of the water and 
nutrients for plant growth and development. It is also the 
layer of soil most affected by the actions of man. Han may
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alter the organic content, tilth, fertility, cation exchange 
capacity (CEC), pH and moisture level of the surface soil, 
thereby directly affecting current and future soil 
productivity.
Finally, note that mineral soils are comprised of the 
following four elements: mineral materials, organic matter,
water and air. A silt loam surface soil in optimum 
condition for plant growth contains about 50 percent pore 
space (which is air and water); 45 percent mineral matter; 
and 5 percent organic matter (Buckman and Brady 1969). 
Altering this mix will change productivity. Soil erosion 
not only alters this mix, but has numerous other detrimental 
effects, which are discussed in the next section.
1.1.2 Erosion
Soil erosion is the process of wearing away the land 
surface by water, wind and other geological agents. This 
research will concentrate on the on-farm effects of 
water-induced sheet and rill erosion.* Soil erosion begins 
when the explosive action of raindrops dislodge particles of 
soil, along with nutrients and other solutes (such as 
pesticides). The resultant runoff is then transported to 
some downslope location. This action is repeated again and 
again, gradually moving the soil and associated elements to 
the bottom of the slope or to a water course where it is 
ultimately delivered to lakes, reservoirs, estuaries, 
harbors and the like. The on-site effect of erosion is
-6-
dramatic.
For example, the eroded material from a 
Collington loam in comparison with the original 
soil contained, in total, 4.7 times as much 
organic matter, 5.0 times as much nitrogen, 3.1 
times as much phosphorous, and 1.4 times as much 
potassium (Buckman and Brady 1969, p. 222).
In addition, the erosion process carries away commercial
fertilizers, thereby reducing their effectiveness and
increasing their application rate.
As indicated in the previous section, soil is created 
through the interaction of parent material and biochemical 
weathering. This would indicate that soil is a renewable 
resource and that under natural conditions, the soil and its 
productivity would at least be held constant or increase 
over time. However, the rate at which soil is being 
produced is difficult to quantify. Soil scientists have 
estimated that soil loss tolerances range from two to five 
tons per acre per year. These tolerable soil loss limits 
were determined during five regional workshops during the 
early 1960's but they have come under strong criticism due 
to their ad hoc nature (Crosson 1983). The overriding 
consideration in setting socially desirable erosion rates (T 
values) was long-term maintenance of adequate soil depth for 
"good" plant growth. In essence, by bequeathing equal soil 
depth across generations, social planners are implicitly 
assuming an interest rate of 0 (i.e. l/(l+i)fc = 1, where i = 
0). If private rates of time preference are positive, then 
clearly, even with the same soil depletion model, the
-7-
private and social rates of soil conservation will be 
different. In general, the deeper the surface soil the 
higher the T value. In addition it should be noted that T
values are employed by conservation planners as goals and,
as such, current soil conservation policy in effect is 
giving equal weight to current and future productivity.
To obtain a better understanding of the rate of soil 
renewal, consider that if soil is produced at the rate of 
three tons per acre per year, has a dry bulk density of 80
pounds par cubic foot, and there is no erosion, then each
year the depth of the soil will increase by .00172 foot. 
Alternatively, it would take 581 years to produce a foot of 
soil with no erosion. With erosion at two tons per acre per 
year (which is a very low erosion rate), it would take 1,743 
years to produce a foot of soil. When erosion rates exceed 
the soil creation rate then clearly no soil is accumulated. 
Since the natural erosion rates are generally slightly lower 
than the rate of soil formation, it is apparent that 
agriculturally productive soils are thousands of years old. 
When agricultural activities result in erosion rates in 
excess of the T value, the farmer is drawing not only from 
the annual flow of soil productivity, but also extracting 
from the stock of soil productivity.
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1.2 Potato Farming in Aroostook County
Aroostook County has historically been among the most 
important potato producing areas in the nation. In 1950, 
Maine produced 22 percent of all fall potatoes grown in the 
United States. However, by the late 1970's Maine's share 
had fallen to 9 percent (USDA Crop Reporting Board).
This reduction in market share is attributed to 
several factors. While other regions experienced increased 
yields per acre during the above period, Maine's yields 
dropped. In fact, Maine's recent yields have been less than 
their 1960 yields (Putnam 1981). Soil erosion, it can be 
argued, has contributed to this decline. In addition,
Putnam lists the following items which have contributed to 
the decline of the Maine potato industry. (1) The growth 
of the processed potato market in the 1960's benefited Idaho 
for two reasons: first, its production was dominated by the
Russet Burbank variety, which possesses important processing 
characteristics; and second, Idaho had several World War II 
vintage dried potato factories which were easily converted 
to other processing techniques. (2) Federal water storage 
projects provided western potato growers with irrigation 
opportunities. (3) Western potato producers employed strict 
inspection standards, through federal marketing orders, to 
improve the quality of fresh market potatoes. (4) Other 
regions developed improved packing and marketing techniques. 
(5) Other producing areas built modern storage facilities
-9-
allowing them to take advantage of spring and summer markets 
(which have higher prices).
Interestingly enough, Maine's 1980 cost of production 
per acre is actually less than Idaho’s (i.e. $806 per acre 
vs. $811 per acre), and only half that of Long Island's 
production cost (Putnam 1981). Thus, the income squeeze for 
Maine derives not from costs, but from yields and prices. 
Notably, it has the second lowest yield per acre of any 
potato growing region.
Further compounding the potato growers' problem, Maine 
potatoes sell at a discount. For example, the 1979 New York 
terminal market price for Idaho potatoes was $0,125 per 
pound, while the Maine price was $0,066 per pound (USDA 
Crop Reporting Board). Although the transportation costs 
for Idaho potatoes are substantially higher, the fact that 
the market supports a higher price for Idaho potatoes 
indicates that potatoes from Maine are not perceived as good 
substitutes.
The manner in which Maine potatoes are marketed also 
negatively impacts the Maine potato industry. Currently 
there are about 1,000 potato farms in Aroostook County (USDA 
Ag. Census 1978). During the 1970's, about 57 percent of 
the tablestock was marketed by individual farmers. In 1976 
there were about 800 different packing lines operating in 
Aroostook County (Putnam 1981). This had adverse effects on 
quality. This unique feature of the Aroostook marketing 
system depends on the existence of marketing intermediaries
-10-
(broker/dealers) which buy from farmers and then sell to 
processors and terminal markets. During the 1978-1979 
season 135 licensed brokers operated in Aroostook County.
Federal marketing orders have not been used in Maine 
since 1963. In 1979 a marketing order for Russet tablestock 
was introduced but it does not include mandatory inspection. 
Other growing areas use the marketing orders to improve the
quality of marketed potatoes (Putnam 1981) .
In short, the Maine potato industry is beset with a 
number of problems which directly and indirectly influence 
soil use rates. It has been suggested that high erosion
rates reduce yields and thus compound the net income
squeeze. Furthermore, a host of exogenous variables 
interact with soil use decision rules, confounding efforts 
to reduce soil use rates.
1.3 Plan of Work
1.3.1 Problem
As indicated earlier, water-induced soil erosion is 
depleting the soil resource not only in Aroostook County, 
but also in the entire United States. In fact, on cropland 
with moderate slopes, more than one-half of the top soil has 
been lost through erosion (Sommers 1979) . Another source 
indicates that during the past 200 years, at least one-third 
of the top soil on cropland has been lost (Pimentel 1976). 
And yet another claim is that during the past 200 years the
-11-
average depth of top soil on cropland has declined from 
three feet to six inches (Jeffords 1979). This degrading of 
the quality (through loss of nutrients, tilth, water-holding 
capacity and other production related characteristics) and 
quantity of the soil resource has been largely masked since 
World War II by technological changes. Genetic improvements 
in crop varieties, the introduction of chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides, and the development of more efficient 
machinery have led technological improvements that increased 
agricultural production fifty percent from 1949 to 1969. 
During this same period, 58 million acres were set aside 
under federal land bank programs and an additional 45 
million acres of cropland were lost to urban and related 
land uses (Pimentel 1976). John F. Timmons summarizes the 
problem:
In the 1950's technology substituted for 
inherent soil productivity. Now the 
technological develop- ments seem to have 
leveled off. There are no break- throughs 
coming along. (Risser 1978, p. 10)
Unfortunately there is no single substitute for the soil
resource which simultaneously provides all the required
characteristics (i.e., nutrients, water, and structural
support).
In addition, the general economy and the federal 
government send constantly changing signals to farmers.
These signals, in the form of prices, interest rates, 
conservation compliance (i.e., a requirement that farmers 
protect highly erodible land or lose all federal farm
-12-
benefits) , and many other factors directly and indirectly 
influence the farmer's conservation decisions. These factors 
increase the tension between the social and the private 
conservation levels. In short, the erosion problem can be 
expressed as a divergence between the private and social 
(defined as T) optimum soil use rates. The divergence may 
be due to poor information; differences between the social 
and private discount rates; or imperfect future land 
markets. In order to better understand this problem, and to 
examine several relationships maintained in the literature, 
this dissertation will derive, estimate and analyze the time 
invariant soil management decision rule. Before the decision 
rule is derived, the literature of soil conservation will be 
reviewed in this section. The following section discusses 
the contribution of this dissertation. Finally, at the end 
of this chapter, an overview of the remainder of the 
dissertation is presented.
1.3.2 Past Research
Research in the area of soil conservation can be 
divided into four broad categories: agronomic,
sociological, economic and policy related. This section 
begins with a cursory overview of the agronomic studies, 
followed by a limited discussion of the sociological 
research. Thereafter a more detailed review of the economic 
literature is provided. This section concludes with a note 
on positions held in policy articles.
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1.3.2.1 Agronomic. In summary, the branch of agronomy 
interested in the effects of erosion seeks to estimate the 
relationship between soil depth {erosion over time) and crop 
yields. By in large, studies in this area have indicated 
that as soil depth declines, yields fall. The actual 
functional relationship varies by crop and soil type. For 
an excellent summary of recent work in this area see Crosson 
and Stout (1983, Chapter 5), or The Proceedings of the 
National Symposium on Erosion and Soil Productivity 
(American Society of Agricultural Engineers 1985). In 
addition, the American Society of Agronomy and the Soil 
Science Society of America (1982) provide a discussion on 
how to establish tolerable soil loss limits for various 
soils.
A typical example of work in this area can be found in 
Langdale, et al. (1979) where field plot data are used to 
estimate the yield-soil depth relationship. They found that 
the loss of 15 centimeters of soil resulted in corn yields 
declining by 40 percent. However, this drop in yields has 
not been observed in annual crop statistics because of the 
masking effect of technological advances. They estimate that 
technological change has increased corn yields 100 percent 
on moderately eroded land during the past 40 years. 
Unfortunately similar information is not available 
concerning potato yields.
Pierce, et al. (1983) discuss the development of a
-14-
soil productivity simulation model which predicts yields 
based on soil bulk density, pH, and available water 
capacity. The underlying concept in their model is that 
over time erosion affects the rooting depth, available water 
capacity, soil nutrient levels, organic content, and surface 
run-off, which causes reduced crop yields. The Pierce model 
has been used by the Soil Conservation Service to estimate 
long term erosion control benefits in PL-566 watershed 
protection projects.
1.3.2.2 Sociological. A number of articles in the 
rural sociology literature have addressed the issue of soil 
conservation. In general they focus on why farmers adopt 
conservation practices and include demographic variables as 
well as perceptions (e.g. conservation ethic) and 
institutional factors in their analysis. See Lee (1980), 
and Lovejoy and Napier (1986) .
Ervin and Ervin (1982) model the conservation 
practice decisionmaking process and conclude that there is 
a "weak" link between government programs and conservation. 
Unfortunately the empirical results of their static model 
and poor data have limited the statistical significance of 
their findings. As such, they suggest that future research 
should employ a dynamic approach. They indicate that debt 
is "popularly perceived" as an important variable in 
conservation decisions. More specifically, high debt 




conservation. They also suggest that age and education are 
positively correlated with conservation.
Napier, et al. (1984) found that the adoption of 
conservation practices could not be explained by 
demographic variables and that the best predictors of 
adoption were economic factors such as farm size and other 
scale variables. They suggest that the adoption of 
conservation practices could be better understood from the 
perspective of risk involved (i.e. the risk involved in 
trying a new management regime).
1.3.2.3 Economics. The earliest work involving an 
economic analysis of soil erosion was done just before World 
War II. Articles by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1938a, 1938b), and 
Ibach (1940) all addressed the depletion of the soil 
resource. They recognized that excessive use was causing a 
reduction in soil productivity and that intergenerational 
effects were occurring. The timing of this interest in soil 
clearly is related to the dust bowl of the 1930's. These 
writers owe an intellectual debt to Gray (1913) and 
Hotelling (1936).
The growth of environmental concerns in the late 
1960's and early 1970's renewed interest in the study of 
soil use rates. These studies usually employed a linear 
programming model to estimate the effects of imposing 
non-point source pollution or erosion regulations on the 
agricultural sector. In summary, the studies indicated that
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erosion can be reduced enough to significantly improve 
water quality with a comparatively small impact on total 
farm income, with the qualification that there could be 
significant redistribution of income to those areas with 
low erosion potential. The Wade and Heady (1977) analysis 
is more or less typical of the linear programming efforts. 
Their study evaluated a modeling scheme designed to link 
the demand for agricultural commodities to generation of 
cropland sediment. They were concerned with the 
adjustments in the agricultural production system induced 
by water quality motivated sediment goals. The model 
employed in analyzing national and interregional impacts 
included production costs, commodity demands and sediment 
production and delivery. The production and transportation 
system models were based on 105 production areas in the 
United States. As in other studies, the Universal Soil 
Loss Equation (USLE) was employed to estimate soil erosion. 
Commodities demanded are based on year 2000 estimates of 
population. The model assumed that labor and capital are 
completely mobile between the present and the year 2000.
The authors stressed that this was a policy model, not a 
predictive or forecast model. Five national sediment 
control policies were evaluated: (1) an unrestricted 
alternative; (2) an alternative which minimized the total 
national sediment load and total production cost; (3) an 
alternative which limited erosion to the rate at which soil 
is produced; (4) an alternative which limited sediment
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loads to 80 percent of the unrestricted alternative 
measured at the producing area; and (5) an alternative 
which limited sediment loads at the mouth of river basins 
to 80 percent of the unrestricted alternatives.
For the minimum sediment alternative, total sediment
delivered to national borders was reduced by 23.3 percent, as
compared to the unrestricted alternative. Sediment from
cropland was reduced 90 percent. However, due to the large
share of sediment from non-cropland sources, the overall
effect was diminished. The tolerable soil loss limit
alternative showed dramatic effects in the Midwest and
Southeast, reducing sediment significantly, while parts of
the West showed increased sediment loads due to cropping
adjustments necessitated by commodity demands. With the
soil loss tolerance (T) limit alternative, the results were
higher food costs to consumers and higher environmental
budget costs. The authors were reluctant to select a best
alternative; however, the tolerable erosion loss limit
alternative:
...places controls at the farm level and 
increases the average and marginal costs of 
commodities produced. It also results in a 
substantial reduction in total sediment load.
Regional erosion differences are recognized by 
this type of control and economic advantages 
change accordingly. If a higher level of 
sediment control is desired, this type of policy 
might prove difficult to administer. (p. 24)
Similar noteworthy studies have been conducted by Forster
and Becker (1979); Osteen and Seitz (1978); and Taylor and
Frohberg (1977) .
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Two recent articles, Burt (1981) and McConnell (1983), 
have measurably advanced the study of the soil resource.
Burt used a dynamic optimization model of the following form:
MAX j; t=1(#(G|ut, xt, yt) / (1 + r)*) (1.2)
where x is depth of topsoil (inches)
y is percentage of soil organic matter
u is percentage of land in wheat
r is discount rate (real)
® is infinity
G(') is an annual net returns function.
Equation (1.2) was maximized subject to the following 
constraints:
xt+i = x t - Q(ut > x t , yt> <I *3 >
yt+l = Yt " H(ut, xt, yt) (1.4)
Where Q (•) is an annual soil loss function and H {-) is an
annual organic matter loss function.
Burt found that intensive crop production (wheat) in 
conjunction with heavy fertilization is the most profitable 
system in both the short and long run (except for very low 
commodity prices). In addition, his model agreed with the 
conventional wisdom that relatively high grain prices 
exacerbate erosion.
McConnell provided a particularly elegant model of the 
soil resource. He proposed that farmers maximize the net 
value of the farm:
MAX N = /oT Ce“rt[pg(t) f(s,x,z)
- cz]dt + R[x(t)]e~rt) (1.5)
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Subject to: dx/dt = k - s
and x(0) = x0
where r is the farmer's discount rate
t is time
p is per unit output price 
g(t) is neutral technical change 
f(*) is the production function 
s is soil loss 
x is soil depth
z is an index of variable inputs 
c is input price index 
R (•) is farm resale value function
k is an exogenous addition to the soil.
In this case, the farmer is maximizing the present value of 
net returns plus the resale value of his farm. The resale 
value is a function of soil depth.
The undiscounted Hamiltonian associated with the above 
optimal control problem is:
From the maximum principle, the optimal paths of z, s, x and 
satisfy the following conditions:
H = [pgf(s,x,z) - cz] + L(k-s) (1.6)
dH(z,s,x,L)/ds = pgfc (s,x,z) - L = 0 
dH(z,s,x,L)/dz = pgfz (s,x,z) - c = 0 
L = rL = dH/dx = L - pgfx (s,x,z) (1.9)
(1-7)
(1.8)
dx/dt = k - s 
x (0) = x0 




Eguations (1.7) through (1.12) yield familiar economic 
conditions. For example, equation (1.7) requires that the 
value of the marginal product of soil is equal to its 
implicit cost, L.
McConnell then assumed the second derivatives of f(*) 
with respect to s and z are less than or equal to zero, for 
fixed values of x, and then solved for ds/dt: (where x 
indicates the time partial derivative of a given variable)
® = fssfstr - P/P - 9/g - fx/f8 - (k-s)(fxs/fs)]
+ fszfx [6/c - p/p “ g/g " (k-s)(f2X/fz] (1.13)
The implications are that higher future prices, lower 
discount rates and movement up the marginal product curve 
will lower current soil loss. One of McConnell's conclusions 
is that rational profit maximizing farmers, even with full 
knowledge of soil productivity relationships, can and will 
deplete the soil resource. As such, public policy should be 
concerned with reducing erosion only where it leads to 
significant externalities.
Kiker and Lynne (1986), commenting on McConnell's 
paper, argued in part that because McConnell's model of 
conservation is a function of market signals, it may not 
reflect long-term societal interests. Their reasoning is 
that:
As production plans are made for the first year, a 
farmer will have some expectation of the prices and 
land values for that year and possibly for the next 
few years. But for each succeeding year, the 
variance of any subjective estimate would be 
increasing at an increasing rate. (p. 739)
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It is this expanding uncertainty which makes it impossible to 
develop a soil conservation plan that is optimal for even the 
intermediate term.
McConnell (1986) countered that the profession does not 
know how uncertainty affects the social optimality of private 
decisions. Furthermore, he argued that in the absence of 
more knowledge of productivity relationships and expected 
prices, "...we are not badly off by trusting our resources 
with those that must make a living from them." (p. 743)
Bhide, Pope and Heady (1982) not only derived a general 
optimal control solution, they also provided numerical 
solutions. Although their model is not stochastic, it does 
show that it is possible to lower the trajectory of soil use 
rates without reducing associated net returns in certain 
areas. They modeled a variety of discount rates, time 
horizons, levels of technological growth, functional 
relationships between soil depth and changes in net returns, 
and three policy objectives.
Clark and Furtan (1983) used a qualitative approach to 
evaluate soil depletion which requires that soil be defined 
in terms of a composite of several factors. For simplicity 
they selected two factors: total nitrogen content and total
precipitation. Neo-classical capital theory is used to 
describe behavior. The results of this study are at odds 
with those of other studies. For example, lowering the 
social discount rate increases depletion rates and altering 
the interest rate has no affect on erosion rates. In
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addition, because they confined their model to two proxies 
for state and control variables, they cannot account for 
interaction between soil and other variables.
Collins and Headley (1983) also investigated soil 
erosion from the perspective of capital theory. They noted 
that soil conservation investments are somewhat unique 
insomuch as they do not create new income streams, but alter 
existing income streams. Their results suggest that the 
optimal decay rate of income, because of soil erosion, is 
dependent upon current farm income, the interest rate, and 
cost effectiveness of conservation practices. Furthermore, 
government subsidies do alter rational farmer behavior.
Finally, although not explicitly concerned with the 
soil resource, Eckstein (1984) recently offered a rational 
expectations model of the allocation of land in Egypt. He 
develops a stochastic optimization model where a farmer must 
allocate an endowment of land between two crops. One crop, 
cotton, depletes soil productivity (nitrogen in Eckstein's 
model) more rapidly than the other crop, wheat. Eckstein's 
model also incorporates rational expectations and costs of 
adjustment.
The farmer's objective is to maximize,
E_x lim E t=0 ,N£Bt (Xlt + (P2t/Plt>X2t n  (1.14)
subject to a land constraint,
^lt + A2t = A (1*15)
Where E_^ is the mathematical expectation operator (last 
period's expectation of this period’s
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discounted income)
B is the discount rate
Xlt is the production of crop 1 at time t (cotton)
X2t is the production of crop 2 at time t (wheat)
Plt is the price of cotton
P2t is the price of wheat
Alt is land allocated at time t-1 for cotton
production
A 2 t land allocated at time t-1 for wheat production 
*
A is total land
The information set that the land allocation decision 
is based upon is:
It_i = £Alt-l'Alt-2*••*' alt-l'a2t-l'•* *'
(P2t-t/plt-l)'(p2t-2/plt-2>'* • •'
1r®t—2»•*•J (1.16)
In this case, a^t is a shock to production of crop i at time
t, and S is a vector of exogenous factors that affect
prices.
The production function for cotton can be written as:
Xlt = <fl + alt “ (9i/2)Ait)Ait + diU _ <Ait-l^A
- Ait/A* ^ Ait (1.17)
where f^, gj and are positive scalars. The first term 
is a quadratic production function and the second term 
incorporates the notion of land depreciation caused by the 
production of cotton. Note that the greater the proportion 
of land allocated to cotton, past and present, the lower the 
production of cotton. If half the land has been and is
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allocated to cotton, then the second term is zero.
The optimal decision rule derived by Eckstein is:
Alt = PlAlt-l + I(PiA*/di(l - Pi)) (mean of R) ] (1.18)
where is the root of an expectational difference equation and 
R is the real shadow price for crop 1 land allocations.
Maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate the 
model. The estimated value of p^, was found to be .081 and 
d^ was -.008. If R is 16.8 and A* is 1,000, then 
Alt = .OBlA^.j - 185.092 
In estimating the model two identifying restrictions 
were employed: (1) the assumption that A^t does not Granger
cause R^ .; and (2) the cross equation restrictions derived 
from the rational expectations assumption. unfortunately the 
model is rejected because the first assumption is violated: 
the shadow price is not exogenous.
In summary, over time the economic analysis of the
soil resource has become more and more sophisticated. Yet 
no single model offers a comprehensive dynamic stochastic 
analysis of the soil resource in a framework where 
expectations are optimal and structural equations are 
estimated.
I.3.2.4 Policy. Finally, a brief summary of articles 
that are less technical and more policy related will help 
outline some of the current thinking surrounding soil 
conservation. See Bradlee (1983), USDA (1982), Pavelis 
(1983), GAO (1983) , and Reichelderfer (1985) for examples of
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work in this area. A commonly-held position is that the 
public's perception of soil conservation is that most farmers 
cannot afford to adopt conservation practices and that soil 
conservation is one of the areas where the market system 
fails - hence it is a classic case where government 
intervention is warranted. Furthermore there is a growing 
concern that other government policies aggravate the soil 
conservation problem. In fact, Osteen (1985) suggested that 
there is a link between erosion rates and agricultural policy 
inherent in export programs, price support programs, and 
production control programs. Moreover he indicated that 
price stabilization policies reduce the need to diversify 
(rotate crops).
Perhaps the key point in the above articles is that 
farmers' make conservation decisions in an environment which 
may provide incentive for farmers to deviate from the 
socially optimal erosion rate. Moreover, the affects of 
policies directed at another problem (e.g. farm income and 
price supports) cannot be ignored.
1.3.3 Objectives
The objective of this study is to better understand 
how farmers make soil conservation decisions. The decision 
to adopt conservation practices to control erosion is a 
complex process which involves a number of economic and 
noneconomic variables. Among these variables are various 
government policies and the farmer's expectations about
-26-
yields, prices and income. In addition, it is a process 
that lends itself to assuming that the farmer is a profit 
maximizer. In maximizing profits, the farmer makes choices 
(e.g. how much to plant of each crop, which is argued later 
is a good proxy for soil management) while facing certain 
constraints (e.g. technology, the state of the soil 
resource, etc.). In short, the conservation decision 
lends itself to mathematical optimization techniques.
This simple optimization problem is made somewhat more 
complex because farmers make current decisions based upon 
their future expectations (supply response models). Once it 
is recognized that expectations are critical in a supply 
response model the next step is to model how expectations 
are formed. In the past, expectation formation was modeled 
as adaptive or backward-looking (Nerlove 1958). Rational 
expectations, on the other hand, takes the view that people 
are forward-looking and incorporate information optimally in 
forming expectations. Eckstein (1985) used a linear 
quadratic model of agricultural supply to show how rational 
expectations models are as good as Nerlovian supply response 
models at fitting the data. Previous work has assumed that 
cyclical aspects of the cobweb model are derived from 
incorrect price forecasts. Eckstein demonstrated that a 
dynamic model with rational farmers can explain the cobweb 
behavior without resorting to assuming that farmers make 
persistent errors. Furthermore, he discussed how the 
rational expectations and Nerlovian supply response models
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are observationally equivalent. That is, they may have the 
same reduced form, but the interpretation of the parameters 
is different. The use of such models has profound 
consequences for the construction of policy analysis models 
because no longer is it implicitly assumed that an 
individual's behavior does not depend upon changes in policy 
variables.
Based on the above, this research will develop dynamic 
nonlinear (quadratic) objective function models that have 
decision rules which are functions of invariant structural 
parameters (including the coefficients of the optimal 
expectations equation). Furthermore, uncertainty will be 
modeled with assumptions about random shocks to variables. 
Specifically a model of the Aroostook County potato 
production will be developed. The model will include a 
conservation adoption function which will depend upon 
variables in other equations within the model, and upon 
events outside the model. With this arrangement it will be 
possible to observe how variables in the optimal decision 
rule affect the adoption of conservation practices, all 
within the overriding farm level profit maximizing 
framework. In summary, the objectives of this study are:
(1) Analyze the nature of the time invariant soil 
use decision rule;
(2) Develop a rational expectations estimation 
technique using commonly-used techniques; and
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(3) Quantitatively examine hypotheses maintained 
in the literature.
1.3.4 Outline
Chapter II discusses rational expectations in general 
and develops a model of potato production. Chapter III 
outlines the econometric estimation strategy and defines the 
data, while Chapter IV presents the results of the 
estimation process. Chapter V analyzes the estimated model, 
and Chapter VI draws conclusions and suggests future 
research.
CHAPTER II
A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF POTATO PRODUCTION
In this chapter a rational expectations model of the 
soil resource of Aroostook County is developed. A 
discussion of rational expectations is followed by a 
demonstration of the Lucas Critique. Finally, after a brief 
discussion of resource economics, the multi-equation model 
to be estimated is described in detail.
II.l Rational Expectations
The literature concerning rational expectations is 
growing rapidly. During the 1970's, it was applied 
primarily to macroeconomic problems, and rational 
expectations is fundamentally associated with the work of 
Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. Application to 
microeconomic problems is expanding. The basic reference is 
Muth (1961), who applied rational expectations to an 
agricultural market. The following is a summary of 
expectations theory.
Based upon the Cagan (1956) work on hyperinflation, 
Nerlove (1958) applied the concept of adaptive expectations 
to agriculture. Nerlove's model was comprised of three
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equations (with time subscripts suppressed):
°Qt = a - bPt (II.l)
SQt = c + dPet (II.2)
Pet = Pt_!e + A (Pt_1 - 0 < A < 1 (II.3)
where DQt is the quantity demanded, Pt is the equilibrium
O
price and b is the slope of the demand curve; Qt is the
quantity supplied, Pe .^ is the adaptively expected price, and
d is the slope of the supply curve; and A is the rate of 
*
adjustment of P to new information. When A = 1, we have 
the original Ezekiel (1938) formulation.
The first-order difference equation of the adaptive 
model solved for the equilibrium path of price is;
Pt = (a - c)/(d + b) + I(-d/b - 1)A
+ l]fc[P0 - (a-c/b+d)] (II.4)
where PQ is the original price and (a-c/b+d) is the 
equilibrium price.
Stability requires that;
|[(-d/b - 1)A+1J| < 1 (II.5)
Note that the coefficient of adaptation acts as a "brake"; 
no matter what the slopes of supply and demand, one can 
specify an A that will result in stability. The impact of 
Nerlove's work was profound: Askari and Cummings (1977)
list over 500 agricultural studies based on Nerlove's work.
Rational expectations models for the agricultural 
sector can be divided into two groups: those with storage
and those without storage. Although the inventory model is
richer, the no-storage model will be discussed here because
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of its simplicity, its compatibility with the above adaptive 
model and because it is compatible with potato production 
where storage from one period to another is not practical 
year to year. Storage is not practical because there are no 
controlled storage facilities in Aroostook County.
Utilizing an agricultural example, Muth (1961) was 
concerned with the dynamic process of economics. He 
recognized that the way expectations are formed will affect 
the time path of variables. Furthermore, he noted that:
(1) averages of expectations in an industry were better 
predictors than naive models and as reliable as elaborate 
equation systems, even with wide cross sectional 
differences? and (2) reported model expectations generally 
understated the magnitude of the actual changes.
Muth responds to these observations with:
In order to explain these phenomena, I should 
like to suggest that expectations, since they 
are informed predictions of future events, are 
essentially the same as the predictions of the 
relevant economic theory. At the risk of 
confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis 
with a pronouncement as to what firms ought to 
do, we call such expectations "rational"....
Our hypothesis is based on ... the ... point 
of view that economic models do not assume 
enough rationality. (p. 316)
In other words, the:
...expectations of firms (or more generally, 
the subjective probability distribution of 
outcomes) tends to be distributed, for the same 
information set about the prediction of the 
theory (or the objective probability 
distribution of outcome). (p. 316)
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More formally, this can be expressed as:
t_!Pet = E[Pt|It_!] + et (II.6)
where t_^Pet is the expected price in period t, It-i is the 
information set available in period t-1, and et is a 
forecast error.
Equation (II.6) states that the expected price is 
equal to the conditional expectation of Pt given the 
information set Note that the expected value of the
error term is zero and the error term is orthogonal 
(uncorrelated) to (with) any information available to 
economic agents. If this was not true, forecasts could be 
improved by taking into account this correlation. Overall, 
expectations will diverge from the actual value only when 
uncertainty is present.
Although the application of rational expectations to 
macroeconomics is relatively new, the reapplication to 
agricultural models is even more recent. One of the first 
articles is the work by Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) 
regarding the broiler market. Their rational expectations 
model passed the likelihood ratio prediction test, and the 
additional information test (future markets). Their 
conclusion was that rational expectations would be 
appropriately applied in other agricultural markets. In 
addition, Cooley and DeCanio (1977) have done a broad 
historical analysis of rational expectations in American 
agriculture. Their results also support the rational 
expectations hypothesis.
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Given the above information, the following no-storage 
rational expectations model is developed for the 
agricultural sector. Under this model, the individual 
farmer asks:
What price should I expect next year taking into 
account the supply decisions of similarly 
situated producers so that my expectations for 
prices will, on average, be correct? (Sheffrin 
1983, p. 157)
Assume a market model where:
where Y is income and w is the weather.
Equating equations (II.7) and (II.8) and taking the 
conditional expectations, obtains:
the expected price reduced form equation is driven by the 
expected values of the exogenous variables. Without the 
expectation of the exogenous variables the solution and 
estimation is straight forward. However, recognizing that 
the above is really an expectational difference equation 
alters the solution and estimation process. Fortunately, 
recent techniques developed by Whiteman (1983 and 1985) make 
it possible to mathematically determine the functional form 
of the above, while analytically determining the existence 




Pet = (dYet - fwet)/(c + b) 
where Ye^ and we  ^are expected income and weather Clearly
(11.10)
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II.2 The Lucas Critique
Although the thrust of this research is not policy 
oriented, it is worth noting that the Lucas Critique (Lucas 
1976) materially altered the way policy models should be 
constructed. The essence of the Lucas Critique is that an 
individual's behavior is not invariant to changes in the 
environment within which decisions are made. In other 
words, if a policy instrument is altered, one cannot assume 
that reduced form coefficients associated with individual 
behavior will remain unchanged. This has econometric 
implications which can be illustrated with a simple example.
Assume there are stochastic supply and demand 
equations given as:
D°t = D0 + DiPt + D2Yt + elt (11.11)
S°t = S0 + Slt_1Pet + S2Gt + e2fc (11.12)
where DQfc j_s the quantity demanded in time t and SQt is the 
quantity supplied in time t. The D's and S's are behavioral 
parameters. Pfc j.s the price of the good in time t and 
t_iP6t is last period's expected period t price. Yt is a 
shift variable (such as income), Gfc is a policy variable, 
and elt and e2t are serially uncorrelated zero mean 
residuals. Qt and Pt are endogenously determined variables, 
and Yfc an<j are exogenous.
The equilibrium condition is:
DQt - S°t (11.13)
Substituting equations (11.11) and (11.12) into (11.13),
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obtains:
D0 + &lpt + D2Yt + elt =
S0 + slt-lpet + s2Gt + e2t (11.14)
Taking the conditional mathematical expectation of (11.14)
yields:
D0 + Dlt.1Pet + =
S0 + Slt-lp6t + S2t-lG0t (11.15)
Solving equation (11.15) for t_iPet results in:
t-lp6t = <S 0-D 0+S2t-lY V D2t-lGet ) (D1-S1 )"1 (II*16)
where t_!Get = E[Gt|lt_1], for example. (11.17)
Conventional policy analysis would take the reduced 
form (equation 11.16) and alter the policy variable Gfc and 
estimate the effect on P^. But note this implicitly assumes 
that the behavioral parameters, D2 for example, are 
invariant to the policy regime. However, the core of the 
Lucas Critique is that changes in the environment in which 
individuals make decisions (i.e. changes in the information 
set) influence behavior. Rational expectations technique 
can solve this problem. It is necessary that the stochastic 
processes driving the exogenous variables be identified, and 
that the structural parameters be estimated. This has been 
accomplished in a general sense by equation (11.17). Note 
that the relationship between the parameters in equation 
(11.16) and coefficients of the stochastic process that 
defines Gfc form what has been termed the hallmark of 
rational expectations - the cross equation restrictions.
In estimating rational expectations models, the key is
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to make certain that all the structural parameters are 
identified. This is critical because it can be assumed over 
relevant ranges that the structural parameters are invariant 
to policy changes. Therefore, if the parameters of expected 
government policy are estimated (equation 11.17) and 
substituted into equation (11.16), it is possible to satisfy 
the Lucas Critique. Then, as variables are altered in the 
information set, it is possible to observe any changes in 
the S2 behavioral parameter and also in the equilibrium 
level. This then suggests that rational expectations models 
may alter the equilibrium dynamics as well as the 
equilibrium. As such there may be a change in the slope as 
well as an initial jump to a new equilibrium path.
II.3 Principles of Exhaustible Resource Economics
Before proceeding with the development of our model, a 
discussion of basic resource economic principles is 
necessary. A number of excellent sources are available 
which summarize resource economics. See Fisher (1981), 
Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Dasgupta (1982), and Herfindahl 
and Kneese (1974).
As Fisher (1981) points out, the primary difference 
between exhaustible resources and other resources is that 
the former are not producible. As such, today's use of an 
exhaustible resource affects production in future periods. 
The effect on future periods can be viewed as an opportunity
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cost (i.e. what could have been produced in the future had 
we not used a unit of the resource today).
These interperiod or dynamic effects alter the normal 
efficiency criteria from:
Price = Marginal Cost
to:
Price = Marginal Cost + Future Opportunity Cost
The above condition can be viewed as the first 
condition of optimal depletion and in general it requires 
that so long as there are future opportunity costs induced 
by current use, the price of the resource will be higher 
than under the producible factor case, and thus the quantity 
used will be lower.
The second condition for optimal depletion is that the 
present value of the opportunity cost (sometimes referred to 
as the user cost, royalty or marginal profit) is the same in 
all periods. If this condition did not hold, then a 
modification in resource use rates could exploit the 
difference in the present value of user cost and increase 
total profits.
In the case of the soil resource, high erosion rates in 
the current period will lower production in future periods. 
The standard textbook example of an exhaustible resource 
involves a resource (such as oil) which has a set price. 
However, the decision process associated with the soil 
resource is somewhat less straight forward than the oil model 
because the choice variable is not soil but rather the
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cultural practice selected by the farmer. The following 




The model formulated below falls in the general class 
of what Chow terms "Models of Optimizing Agents" (Chow 
1983). Such models are largely based on the pioneering 
work of Lucas and Sargent (1981), which derives from 
engineering control literature (Anderson and Moore 1971, 
Kwakernaak and Sivan 1972) . These models can be 
characterized by the following stochastic optimal linear 
state feedback control system.
First it is assumed that economic agents face an 
environment which can be described by a linear system of 
equations, including stochastic disturbances, Next it is
assumed that the objective function can be approximated by a 
quadratic form. Specifically, the economic agents will work 
within the constraints of a linear production function and a 
quadratic cost equation. By maximizing profit (the objective 
function) subject to the linear and stochastic environment, 
we are able to obtain optimal decision rules where the choice 
variables are linear functions of predetermined variables.
Key references concerning the modeling of stochastic 
dynamic optimization systems are Lucas and Sargent
-39-
"Introduction" (1981); Hansen and Sargent (1981); Chow 
(1981); Chow (1983); Whiteman (1983); Rosenman (1986); 
Rosenman and Whiteman (1985); and Sargent (1979). Perhaps 
the most profound contribution of modeling optimizing 
behavior is that it explicitly forces the analyst to 
simultaneously consider the theoretical, policy, 
mathematical and econometric aspects of a problem.
As the first step, the model will be formulated in 
matrix notation, then the explicit functional form of each 
equation will be discussed in detail. In the matrix 
formulation, the following notation and variables will be 
used.
B is the farmer's discount rate 
is output at time t 
is a pxl vector of state variables 
Nfc is a qxl vector of control variables 
Ct is cost at time t 
Jt is profits at time t 
E is the expectations operator
is the price of output 
wt is a qxl input price vector 
The environment in which decisions are made is represented by 
linear equations of motion (transition equations) which 
describe how the exogenous state variables evolve over time.
Mt+1 = GMt + HNt (11.18)
where G is a pxp matrix of coefficients and H is a pxq 
matrix of coefficients. The linear-quadratic model requires
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that the transition equations be expressed as linear 
functions. Farm production, Y^f is also expressed as a 
linear functions
= a'Mt + b'Nt + e'Mt.! + f'Nt.! (11.19)
where a and e are pxl and b and f are qxl coefficient 
vectors. The cost function contains quadratic components 
which in effect produce a concave profit function. The cost 
function is given by:
Ct = w ’ZNt + M'UMt + Nt'VNt_1 (11.20)
where w is a qxl vector of input prices and z, U, and V are 
qxq, pxp and qxq matrices of implicit cost coefficients.
It is assumed that the farmer's objective is to 
maximize expected discounted profits over an infinite time 
horizon. Profits are defined as:
Jt = Pt+l<*t " Ct> (11.21)
hence the farmer's objective is given as:
Max EQ i BtJt (11.22)
where Eg is defined as the time 0 expectation conditional on
the information set available at time 0 (i.e.
The optimal decision rules for the choice variables can 
now be derived by maximizing (11.22) subject to the 
constraints implicit in equations (11.18), (11.19) and 
(11.20). The input demand equations are found by rearranging 
the first order necessary conditions of the above 
maximization problem.
The following expresses equation (11.22) with (11.19) 
and (11.20) substituted for Yfc and C f
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J = E0 Bt [Pt+1(a'Mt + b'Nt + e 'Mt-1 + f'Nt.i)
- W'ZNt - Mt’UMt - Nt'VNt.i] (11.23)
Taking the partial of J with respect to the choice variables 
yields:
(dJ/dNt) = B°EtPt+1b - B°ZWt - B°VNt_1 + BEtPt+2Ha
+ BEtPt+2f - BZH'GUMt - BH'UHNfc - B2VENfc+1 = 0 (11.24)
Collecting the choice variable terms gives:
B0vNt_i + BH'UHNt + B2VEtNt+1
= B°EtPt+1b - B°ZWt + BEtPt+2H'e + BEtPfc+2f - BZHGUMt (11.25) 
The factor demand equations are obtained by rearranging and 
lagging (11.25):
Nt = [2V]"1-H'UHNt_1 - B_1VNt_2 - ZII'GUM*..!
- B-1ZWt_1 + EtPt+1(H’e + f) + B-1Ptb (11.26)
The first three terms on the right-hand side represent the 
user costs imposed on profit by past use rates; the fourth 
term is marginal cost; the fifth term is the expected 
marginal revenue; and the final term is lagged marginal 
revenue.
Next, using the following definitions, the specific 
form of each of the model's equations are discussed.
= Profit
Pt = Price of potatoes (per cwt)
= Yield per total acreage farmed (in cwt/ac)
= Weather
CP£ = Crop rotation [ac oats/(ac potatoes 
+ ac oats)]
xt = Index of purchased inputs (per ac)
1
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SDt = Soil depth 
Dt = Farm debt (per ac)
Gt = Government expenditures for financial 
assistance (per ac)
= Index of prices paid 
K = Optimal Dfc/sDt ratio 
E0 = Time zero expectations operator 
B = Discount rate (l+i)-t where i is the rate of time 
preference
11.4.2 Transition Equation
Again, the first step in building the model is to 
describe the environment in which economic agents make 
decisions. The evolution of the state variables is governed 
by the following relationships:
SDt+l = a0 + + a2CP^ + (11.27)
pt+l = 1 i=0,NfPipt-i + ePt (11.28)
Gt +1 = E i=0,NfGiGt-i + eGt (11.29)
Rt+ 1 = E i=0,NfRiRt-i + eRt (11.30)
wt+l = E i=0,NfWiwt-i + ewt (11.31)
Dt+ 1 = I i=0,NfDiDt-i + eDt (11.32)
The soil depth transition equation is central to this 
model. Its form, linear in the parameters, is derived from 
the requirements of a linear quadratic model. It is 
hypothesized that purchased inputs (e.g. fertilizer) can 
replenish soil productivity (recall Timmons). Note from the 
literature on soil productivity that soil depth is a good
1
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proxy for soil productivity. In addition, equation (11.27) 
allows prior soil depth, previous soil management and 
government cost sharing to influence next period's soil 
depth. Finally, an exogenous shock such as a critically 
timed thunderstorm is allowed to affect soil depth. The 
evolution of the remaining exogenous variables take an 
autoregressive form.
Based on the literature, it is expected (and will be 
tested) that a£, a^ and a^ are greater than zero and that if 
other inputs (X) can replenish soil productivity, then 
will also be positive.
II.4.3 Production Function
The production function for potatoes in Aroostook 
County is made linear in the parameters and is represented 
by a first order Taylor series expansion. Although the 
underlying production function may be nonlinear in the 
parameters, it is assumed that over the relevant range of 
data the linear approximation is appropriate. The 
production function is given by:
^t = ® 0  + ®l^t + s2 ^t—1 + ®3C?t + s4^ **t-l + s5 SD^
+ s6wfc + s7Wt _ 1 + S g Y ^  (11.24)
Yield, Yt, is measured as the average potato yield across all 
cultivated acreage (i.e., the sum of potato and oat acreage). 
The crop rotation or soil management variable, allows
last year's rotation to influence this year's yield, thereby 
introducing a dynamic element directly into the production
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function. The rationale for including last period's rotation 
is based on the work by Hepler, Long and Wenderoth (1985) .
In addition to current purchased inputs (Xt), lagged Xt is 
included to allow for any carry-over effects of inputs such as 
fertilizer. Production is also assumed to be a function of
soil depth, SDfcf an(j current and past weather, Wt and 
where weather is measured as the absolute deviation from 
average summer rainfall. Absolute deviation is used because 
too much rain will pond in low areas thereby drowning the 
crop, and too little rainfall will stunt the plant. In 
addition, Thompson (1985) states that the relationship 
between weather variables and yield (for soybeans) can be 
represented by a parabolic curve. The choice variables are 
defined as CP^ . an(j an<j the state variables as SDf. and
wt. We assume that Xt, Xt-1, CPt.^, and SDt are normal 
inputs and therefore S2 and S4 and S5 are non negative. 
However as the absolute deviation from normal rainfall 
increases, we expect yield to fall. Hence, the expected
signs on Sg and S7 are negative. Last period's yield is 
expected to be negatively related to current yield because 
the greater the yield, the lower the carry-over of purchased 
inputs. Finally, the sign of CP^ . is expected to be negative 
because as CPfc increases, the adjusted yield (by definition) 
should decrease.
11.4.4 Cost Equation
The quadratic cost equation is somewhat more complex
1
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than the production function and is represented by: 2
Ct = r0 + riRtXt + r2/2(Dt-SDtK) 2
+ r3/2(CPt-CPt-j) 2 (11.34)
The first term represents the fixed costs associated with 
growing potatoes. The second term is what one would 
normally think of as variable costs (i.e., input prices 
times input quantities). The third term admits symmetric 
costs associated with variation from the optimal ratio of 
debt and soil depth. In this case, since farm debt is 
largely collateralized by farm land (which has its value 
defined by the sum of the discounted future net returns), 
one would expect that as soil depth declines and the asset 
value of land falls, that the optimal debt supported by the 
land would also fall. The symmetry is approximate and 
follows from the following reasoning: Borrowing too much
increases both the risk of default and the interest rates 
faced by the farmer. On the other hand, borrowing too 
little causes the farmer to forego economies of scale. A 
rule of thumb used in the agricultural finance literature 
for a reasonable level of debt is 40 percent of assets 
(Drabenstott and Duncan 1985) . If it is assumed that 
cropland prices in Aroostook County are $300 per acre, and 
that top soil depth is 1 2  inches, then:
(Dt / S D t ) = k ( 1 1 . 3 5 )
or:
K = <Dt/SDt)
K = (.4 [300]/12)
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K = 10
The final term represents the costs associated with the 
adjustment of one of the choice variables, CP. Recall that
<CPt-CPt-l) ttie change in soil management (rotation). As 
such, this last term can be construed as a symmetric cost of 
adjustment component of total costs. The approximate symmetry 
derives from the argument that increasing the proportion of 
potatoes in the rotation will require additional storage 
facilities or larger equipment and will require additional 
applications of pesticides. Lowering the proportion of 
potatoes in the rotation will idle fixed resources such as 
equipment and storage facilities. The expected signs for r^, 
r2 , and r3 are all positive.
11.4.5 Objective Function
The objective of the representative farm is to 
maximize its expected per acre present value:
MAX J = Eq £ t=0 fT£Bt [Pt+1 Yt - CtlJ (11.36)
Substituting equations (11.33) and (11.34) into (11.36) 
yields:
J " E0 E t=0,T^fit^ Pt+lts0 + slxt + s2xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l 
+ s5 SDt + s6Wt + s7wt _ 1 + E g Y ^ ]
“ Ir0 + rlRtxt + r2 /2(Dt-SDtK) 2
+ r3 /2(CPt-CPt_1)2])) (11.37)
The technological constraints embodied in the objective 
function and the equations of motion are used to find a
solution to the time invariant decision rules governing the
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choice of X and CP. These behavioral equations can take the 
form of expectational linear stochastic difference equations. 
They are derived by rearranging the first order necessary 
conditions of the maximization problem.
There are a number of estimation strategies available. 
Most, such as the Maximum Likelihood Riccati equation 
method, are difficult and do not provide analytical 
solutions. For example, if the optimal decision rules are 
time invariant (i.e., they reach some equilibrium) iterative 
techniques can only suggest by brute force that such an 
equilibrium exists. This combination of estimation 
difficulties and ad hoc equilibrium conditions leads one to 
the Rosenman (1986) method for obtaining analytical 
solutions and a reinterpretation of the three stage least 
square method for estimation. The estimation procedures 
will be discussed in the following chapter.
II.4. 6  Decision Rules
In this section the form of the optimal decision rules 
are derived. Specifically, the Euler equations (factor 
demand equations) or first order necessary conditions which 
can be expressed as expectational difference equations will 
be computed. The Euler equations will then be solved 
utilizing the technique in Rosenman (1986).
The procedure for obtaining the Euler equations is 
found in a number of sources including Sargent (1979),
Hansen and Sargent (1981), and Chow (1983). The procedure
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can be condensed to the following steps:
1) Substitute control variables for state variables in 
the objective function.
2) Obtain the first order necessary conditions 
(stochastic Euler equations) by differentiating the 
objective function with respect to the choice variables.
3) Canonically factor the Euler equations so that the 
choice variables are functions of their own lagged values 
and the conditional expectations on future state variables.
Recall the objective function, equation (11.37):
J = EQ E t=o,TtBtl-Pt + l *s0 + slXt + s2Xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l 
+ s5SDt + s6W t + + S g Y ^ ]
- I r 0 + + r2 / 2  (Dt-SDtK) 2
+ r3/2(cpt-cpt_1)2i n
The first step would be to substitute the transition equation 
(11.27):
= ag + ajxt + a2 CPt + a3 SDt + a^ G^ . 
into equation (11.37), but since SDfc+1 does not appear in 
(11.37), it is possible to directly take the first derivative 
of J with respect to the choice variables, CP and X.
First the Euler equation for Xt £s derived. The 
partial of J (Equation 11.37) with respect to Xfc is:
dJ/dXt = BlPt+1 - riRt (11.38)
Moving ahead one period:
J = E0 2 t=l,T^B^ Pt+2 f s0 + slxt+l + s2xt + s3CPt+l + s4CPt 
+ s5SDt+i + S6Wt+i + S7Wt + sgYt]




J = E0 Z t=0,TBtfPt+2Is0 + Elxt+1 + s2xt + s3CPt+l + s4CPt 
+ S5 (Sq + + a2CP.t- + a^ SD-j. + a4 G^)
+ s6wt+l + s7wt + s8 yt^  "fr0 + rlRt+lXt+l 
+ r2 /2(Dt+1 -(aQ +ajxt + a2CPt + a3SDt + a4Gt ) K ) 2  
+ r3 /2(CPt+1 -CPt)2]3 (11.40)
and take dJ/dX^ again:
dJ/dXfc = B[s2 Pt + 2  + s5 a1 Pt + 2  “ r2a4alGtR2 “ r2a3alCPtK 
-r2 a1 a2 SDtK2 - r2 a1 2 XtK2 - r2 a1 aQK2 + r2 a1 Dt+1 K] (11.41)
Combining (11.38) and (11.41) yields the first order necessary 
condition for a sequence of {Xfc} to maximize the objective 
function. Dividing by B yields:
"r2K2aia0 + B_1s1Pt+1 - B~1r1Rfc + (s2 +s3a1)Pt+2 - r2K2aia4Gt 
" r2 K2 ala3CDt -r2 K2 ala2 SDt - r2 K2 a1 2 Xt
+ r2 KalDt+l = 0 (11.42)
Rearranging (11.42) and taking expectations results in:
r2 R2 alxt = - r2 R2 ala 0 - B"lrlRt + B"lslEtPt+l
+ (s2 + s5a1)EtPt+2
r2x2 ala4Gt “ r2x2 ala3CPt “ r2 R2 ala2 SDt
(11.43)
or
xt = m0 + + m2 EtPt + 1  + m3 EtPt + 2  + m4 Gt + m5 CPt
+ m6 SDt + ti7 EtDt + 1 (11.44)
where:
mo = -aoai
ral ■ -r1 (BK2 r2 a1 ) - 1
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m2 = si(BK2 r2ai2 ) _ 1
m3 = (s2 + s5al)(BK2 r2 ai2) 1
m4 = "a4al 1 
n>5 = -3 3 a! 1
m 6 = “a2 al_ 1  
m 7 = (Ka^ - 1
Note that in the case of purchased inputs the decision rule 
is not an expectational difference equation. Recall that it 
has been assumed that X is a normal input, hence the sign on 
m^ is expected to be negative. The sign on m4, since is 
viewed as a subsidy payment, is expected to be positive. If 
X is complementary with SD, then mg is expected to be 
positive. Soil management and X may be viewed as 
substitutes, hence the expected sign on CP would be 
negative. The signs on Pt + 1  and pfc+2 depend on the
substitution between periods. Lastly, the sign on is
expected to be positive if a1 is greater than zero.
The decision rule for CP is more complex because it 
includes endogenous expectations. Again, as with purchased 
inputs, the process begins by taking the partial of J with 
respect to CPt.
dJ/dCPt = s3 Pt + 1  - r 3 (CPt - CP,..!) (11.45)
and next period's derivative is:
dJ/dCPt = B [s4 Pt + 2  + s5 a3 Pt + 2  - r2a4a3K2Gt - r2a3zK2CPt 
—r 2 a2 a^K2 SD^ . — r2 a3 a^K2^^ — r2 a3 aQK2
+r2a3KDt + l “ r3^CPt+l “ CE>t^ (11.46)
Combining (11.45) and (11.46) and collecting CP terms yields:
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B'lr3CPt-l " (B_1 r3 - r2 k2 a3 2 + r3 )CPt - r 3 CPt + 1
= + r3a3 aoK2 “ B"ls3Pt+l
_<S4+a3s5>pt+2 + r2a3a4K^Gt + r2a2a3R2sDt 
 ^^2 a3 *^ l^  Rt ^2a3RBt+l (11.47)
or
"r 3CPt+ l  + (-B_ l r 3 " r 2K2a22 ♦ r 3)CPt  +B_1r 3CPt _1 
= [•] (11.48)
Applying the expectations operator and dividing by (_r3) one 
obtains:
EtCPt+l - f- ® " 1 - r3"lr2a22 K 2  + 1)CPt - B“lcPt-l 
= ' r3~lr2a3a0k2 + B"ls3r3EtPt+l + r3_1(S4 + a3s5>EtPt+2 
r3 lr2a4a3k2Gt “ r3 lr2a2a3k2sDt ~ r3 lr2a3alk2xt 
+ r3_lr2a3kEtDt+l (11.49)
Solving for EtcPt + 1  yields:
Etcpt+1 = “ r3 lr2a3a0k2 
+ ( l - r 3“1r 2a 22k2 “ B_1)CPt  + B_1CPt _1
+ B 1 s3 r3 1 E 1Pt + 1  + r3 1 (s4 + a4 s5 )EtPt + 2
" ^"3 r2 a4 a3k r3 r2 a2 a3k SD^ r3 r2 a3 a^k
+ r3_lr2a3kEtDt+l (11.50)
Unfortunately the above equation cannot be estimated in
its current form because of the expectational term on the
left-hand side. Notice however, that
EtCPt+l = CPt+i ♦ et (H.51)
where efc j.s a serially independent, identically distributed 
residual generated by errors in expectations. By substituting 
(11.51) into (11.50) and lagging, an estimable form is 
realized.
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CPt = ZO + ziCPt-1 + Z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l
+ z 5 G t - l  + z 6 EBt - l  + Z 7 X f c - l  + z g D t  + e f l  ( 1 1 . 5 2 )
where 
zO = -r3 ^r2a3a0K^
Z 1 = 1 - r3 'lr2a2 2
Z 2 = B" 1
z3 = B_ls3r3- 1
Z4 = r3  ^^ s4+a3s5)
Z5 = -r3 lr2a4a3R2
z 6 = -r3"lr2a2a3K2
Z7 = "r3_lr2a3alK2
Z 8
= ^3 2 ®3^
It is worthwhile to discuss briefly the structural 
components of the coefficients in the soil management 
equation. Note that in through Zg, the ratio of r2^r3 *s 
present. This implies if costs are more sensitive to the 
soil depth to debt ratio than to the costs of adjusting the 
rotation, then the influence of all non rotation variables 
in the soil management decision rules will be increased. In 
addition, the greater the sensitivity of soil depth to the 
rotation, the greater the influence of these same variables 
on the soil management decision rule. Finally, if the 
optimal soil depth to debt ratio (K) increases, so will the 
impact of debt, soil depth, purchased inputs and government 
cost sharing on soil management.
Because there is no data on total farm costs, it will 
be impossible to estimate the parameter of cost equation
directly. However, the cross equation restrictions will 
allow estimation of the cost equation parameters if they are 
identified. Identification in this case requires that the 
structural equations including the factor demand equations 
for both X and CP be estimated.
As for the expected signs of the coefficients in the 
soil management Euler equation, it is expected that the 
coefficient on expected price is positive. In other words, 
higher future prices will encourage conservation. In 
addition, it is expected that if Xfc and CPt are substitutes, 
then the sign on will be negative. The sign on SD may
be negative because as soil depth declines, since the land 
base suitable for cropland is fixed, the remaining asset 
becomes more critical to production. In essence the SD term 
provides the farmer with information regarding his location 
on the yield-soil depth curve. In addition, very shallow or 
very deep soils should send weaker signals for conservation 
than moderately eroded soils where yields are being affected 
significantly by soil depth. Since the soils of Aroostook 
County have been cropped for at least 100 years, it is 
assumed that soil depth's influence is negative and very 
small. The sign of Gt is difficult to gauge. The reason 
for this is that G is measured in terms of Agriculture 
Conservation Program (ACP) cost sharing payments, which are 
more closely allied with enduring conservation practices.
As such, increasing G may allow a farmer to apply practices 
like a diversion to reduce his erosion rate, while at the
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same time holding constant or increasing his rotation 
intensity. Finally, higher debt, if r3f r 2  an(j & 3  are 
positive, ought to encourage conservation.
II.4.7 Summary
The equations to be estimated and the cross equation 
parameter restrictions are summarized below.
Production Function;
Yt = s0 + slXt + s2Xt-l + s3CPt + s4CPt-l + s5SDt 
+ s6wt + s7Wt _ 1 + s8Yt-l 
Transition Equations;
SDt+l = a0 + alxt + a2SDt + a3CPt + a4Gt
Etpt+ 1 = b 0 + blpt + b 2 pt-l
Et°t+ 1 = c 0 + clDt + c2 °t-l 
Euler Equations;
CPt = z0 + zlCPt-l + z2cpt-2 + z3pt + 2 4Etpt+l
+ z5Gt-l + z6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z8°t + et-l 
xt = m 7 + mjRt + m2 Pt + n>3 Pt + 1  + m4 Gt







m3 = (s2 + s
m4 = -a4al_ 1








m7 = (Ka! ) - 1
and
z 0 = -r3 lr2a3a0R2
Z 1 = 1 - r3 ^r2 a2 2
Z 2
= B' 1
Z3 = B 1 S3 r3 1
z4 = r 3 1 <s4+a3s5*
z5 = -r3 1 r2 a4 a3 K2
Z 6 = -r3_lr2a2a3K2
z7 = -r3 1 r2 a3 a1 K2
z 8 = r3_lr2a3K
The coefficients in the cost equation,
Ct = r0 + r^tXt + r2/2(Dt - SDtK)2 
+ r3/2(CPfc - CPt.i)2 
can be computed by rearranging m 2 and zg. 
^  = -m1 r2 k2 a12B
r 2 = z4 (a2al^^r3 1
r3 = “ <s2 + a2s3>z2 1





One clear indication of how new the techniques of 
rational expectations estimation are can be found by quickly 
reviewing the literature. Whiteman (1983), Chow (1983), 
Hansen and Sargent (1981), Lucas and Sargent (1981) and 
Wallis (1980), as well as a host of others, offer a range of 
techniques including Matrix Ricatti, Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood, Two Stage Least Squares and so on. One 
of the objectives of this research is to identify a general 
technique which, while satisfying the theoretical 
constraints, is also straight forward and readily accessible 
to applied economists.
Recall the optimal time invariant decision rule for 
soil management (equation (11.52)).
CPt = z0 + zlCPt-l + + z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l
+ z5Gt-l + z6SDt-l 4 z7xt-l + z8°t + et-l (III.l) 
and the decision rule for purchased inputs (equation
(11.44)):
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Xt = m0 + mlRt + m2Etpt+l + m3Etpt+2 + m4Gt
+ m5CPt + m6SDt + m7EtDt+1 (III.2)
Note that all variables on the right-hand side are 
observable at planting time except future potato prices and 
future debt. Therefore, in order to estimate the Euler 
equations, it is necessary to predict and Dt+1. In
predicting and Dt+i» it is possible to use either an
autoregressive representation (AR) or a moving average 
representation (MA) (or an ARMA or ARIMA representation). 
Whittle (1983) shows that both the AR and MA processes are 
part of a larger class of processes that are characterized 
by rational spectral density functions (stationary 
processes). Here Whittle provides a purely technical 
definition of "rational expectations" if such expectations 
are formed with linear least squares estimators. In 
addition he notes, "It is, however, the first form of the 
predictor [the autoregressive process] which is the more 
convenient, since this expresses * t + 1  directly in terms of 
observed quantities; xfcf Xt_± ... » (p . 32). Based on the 
above, and computed autocorrelation coefficients, an 
autoregressive form is adopted for the optimal linear 
predictor of exogenous explanatory variables.
The model to be estimated consists of the production 
function (equation (11.33)), the soil depth transition 
equation (equation (11.27)), the Euler equations (equations
(11.44) and (11.52)), and an autoregressive representation 
for the forecasted state variables (expected price and
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expected debt).
Yt = so + + S2 Xt_i + S3CPt-l + s4cpt + s5SDt
+ s6wt * s7wt-l + s8 yt-l + eYt (III.3)
SDfc+1 = aQ + axXt + a2CPt + a 3SDt + a4 Gt + eSDt (HI*4) 
CPt = zQ + ZjCP,...,^  + + z2 CPt _ 2 + z3 Pt + z4EtPt + x
+ z5Gt-l + z6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z8 °t + et-l (III.l)
Xt = mO + mlRt + m2EtPt+l + m3EtPt+2 + m4Gt
 ^ + rrigSD^. + (1 1 1 *2 )
EtPt+l = bO + blPt + b2Pt-l + eEPt (III.5)
EtDt+l = cO + clDt + c2Dt-l + eEDt (III.6 )
One would expect that if the above equations were
estimated individually, they would suffer from simultaneity
bias. For example, the expected price variable in equation
(III.l) might be correlated with the error term associated
with the Euler equation. Furthermore, the error terms
across equations may be correlated; that is, a given
exogenous shock may induce cross correlations between error
terms.
The simultaneity bias can be corrected with Two Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS); Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
can correct the error term correlation across equations; and 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) can be used for both 
problems associated with the disturbance term. The basic 
idea for the following method is to solve the Euler 
equations and create instruments for variables with 
expectations. These instruments can then be used to 
re-estimate the Euler equations. This approach is
1;
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attributed to David Hendry by Charles Whiteman (1985).
Recall that in a rational expectations model the 
subjective expectations of the economic agent are equal to 
the objective expectations plus a random error term. In 
constructing the above model it was first assumed that the 
underlying structure of the objective expectations process 
takes an autoregressive form. Next it was assumed that the 
subjective expectations are conditional on the information 
set. In turn the information set is defined as those 
variables which lie outside the control of the economic 
agent; or, in the terminology of 2SLS, they are 
predetermined variables. Fortunately, these relationships 
can be incorporated into the estimation process.
The first step is to regress the six econometrically 
endogenous variables (Yfc, SDt, CPt, EtPt+1, EtDt+1, and Xt) 
on all the predetermined variables. By doing this the model 
is actually estimating the subjective (or conditional) 
expectations. Next, in the second step of Two Stage Least 
Squares, the fitted econometrically endogenous variables 
(derived from the first stage) are substituted for the 
original variables and each of the six equations are 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Interestingly 
enough, in performing the above regressions the rational 
expectations conditions are satisfied. In equations (III.5) 
and (ill.6 ), the subjective expectations are regressed on 
the objective expectation process. Finally, in the third 
stage the Seemingly Unrelated Regression is employed to
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estimate all six equations at one time thereby accounting 
for the cross equation correlations of the error terms.
Since the cost equation cannot be estimated directly, 
it is not possible to impose nonlinear restrictions on the 
coefficients of the Euler equation. However, the cross 
equation restrictions can be used to identify the cost 
equation parameters.
III.2 Assumptions
As mentioned above, the fundamental assumption of 
rational expectations is that economic agents have the 
correct model, or more explicitly "the hypothesis of 
rational expectations amounts to equating the subjective ... 
distribution to the objective distribution..." (Lucas and 
Sargent 1981, p. xvi). It follows then, if the researcher 
attempts to correctly model the behavior of individuals, 
then he too will share this correct model. Chow (1983) 
points out that even if these two assumptions are satisfied 
(i.e. the economic agents t^ ave the true model and the 
researcher correctly models behavior), the coefficients of 
the optimal decision rule are not shared by the 
econometrician and the economic agent because individuals do 
not know the actual values of the parameters. As such, Chow 
suggests that no one knows how to compute the truly optimal 
decision rule. Furthermore, the certainty-equivalence
-61-
strategy employed here assumes that the steady state is 
realized for the optimal decision rule.
In addition, since aggregate data is used, what is 
derived is an optimal decision rule for a representative 
farmer. This raises the question of the applicability of 
the results because actual farmers might have heterogeneous 
productions as well as dissimilar environments and hence 
different optimal decision rules. It is argued that the 
methods of rational expectations reap benefits that 
overshadow the above criticisms. The primary source of 
these benefits is the accommodation of the Lucas Critique 
and a more complete neoclassical optimizing paradigm.
Equation (III.l), the optimal decision rule for soil 
management, already incorporates uncertainty directly 
through random errors in expectations. Uncertainty is also 
added with the assumption that the exogenous variables (the 
variables the farmer cannot control or affect) evolve 
stochastically, or that there are errors in the variables. 
Hansen and Sargent (1980) discuss, in some detail, the need 
for and nature of the disturbance term of the Euler 
equation. They suggest two plausible explanations for the 
error terms: (1 ) economic agents observe and respond to more 
variables than the econometrician; or (2 ) variants of 
"errors in variables" models. The use of the autoregressive 
process for describing the path of exogenous variables 
relies on "more variables" interpretation of the error 




stochastic component of the Euler equation. It is also 
assumed that technological relationships are relatively 
constant over the data period.
III.3 Data
The data used to estimate the model were obtained from 
various United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
Publications and can be found in the Agricultural Statistics 
series. Yield estimates for potatoes are average yields per 
total acreage of oats and potatoes. Yields were adjusted by 
total acreage to capture, in aggregate data, the effect of 
rotation changes on yields and to ensure that nonintensive 
rotations would not dominate the model.
The soil management variable is estimated by the 
proportion of oats to total acreage. The greater the 
proportion of oats, the better the soil management. This 
variable's name, "CP", was selected because of the inverse 
relationship to the C and P factors in the Universal Soil 
Loss Equation. Based on interviews with local 
conservationists and a review of the FARMS Data (Hepler, et 
al 1985), the P factor has essentially remained constant 
over time (and quite high). Since tillage systems have only 
begun to change in the past few years, the primary force 
determining the C factor has been the crop rotation. As 
such, it is expected that the estimated CP will be a close 
approximation of actual soil management.
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Nonsoil inputs, Xt  ^ are based on a composite of 
purchased and nonpurchased farm inputs for the Northeast.
It has been adjusted to a per acre basis by dividing by 
total acres.
Soil depth (which can be viewed as a quantitative as 
well as a qualitative input) was estimated with the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation. The rainfall factor (R) is 
constant over time and set at 75. The soil erodibility 
factor (K), length of slope (L) , and percent slope (S) were 
obtained from the FARMS data. It is assumed that K and S 
are constant over time, which is not unreasonable because 
erosion rates are low enough over the sample period that K 
will not vary significantly. L can be changed only with 
diversions or terraces, which have not changed significantly 
during the sample period. The FARMS data were used to 
estimate the P value which again, according to interviews, 
has not in aggregate changed over the sample period. The C 
factor was estimated with rotation data: A starting soil
depth is assumed and the erosion rate is computed for each 
year. The erosion is then converted to inches and 
subtracted from the prior year's soil depth. Estimated soil 
depths compare well with measured depths (wooded vs. cropped 
soils) .
The weather (W) variable is the absolute deviation 
from summer rainfall for Presque Isle, Maine. The theory 
here is that too much or too little rain will retard yields. 
The government variable (G) is real ACP cost sharing per
acre for the state of Maine. The potato prices (P) are real 
potato prices for the state of Maine. The debt variable (D) 
is total real farm mortgage debt in the Northeast per acre 
of Aroostook cropland. Finally, the price of nonsoil inputs
(Xt) is an index of prices paid by farmers in the Northeast. 
All nominal dollars have been adjusted to 1967 values using 
the Consumer Price Index.
In order to produce a stationary data set, the data 
were logged, demeaned, and differenced twice. Inspection of 
the plotted data, autocorrelation coefficients, and 
descriptive statistics suggests that the data are in fact 




IV. 1 Estimated Coefficients
The model was estimated by the microcomputer version 
of RATS. The RATS Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three 
Stage Least Squares (3SLS) routines were used to estimate 
the six equation model detailed in Chapter II. As noted 
earlier, one drawback of using 3SLS is that if one of the 
equations is improperly specified and its error term is 
correlated with the disturbance in other equations, then any 
efforts to exploit this correlation to improve the 
asymptotic efficiency of the estimated coefficients will 
transmit the bias across all the equations. With this in 
mind, the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates are discussed below. 
Because of the relatively poor specification of the 
production function and especially the purchased inputs 
factor demand equation there was some concern about using 
the 3SLS results. Consequently, both the results for the 
2SLS and 3SLS estimations are reported in Table IV.I. See 
the regression results in the Appendix for detailed results.
Choosing between the two sets of coefficients is difficult 
at best. There was little difference between the sets of 
estimated coefficients in terms of sign or magnitude. 
However, as would be expected, the 3SLS estimates are more 
efficient. It is on this basis that the 3SLS estimates will 
be used to analyze the model.
-67-
TABLE IV. 1
Comparison of 2SLS and 3SLS Estimated Coefficients
Equation Variable 2SLS 3SLS
SD(t) X(t-l) 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2
SD(t-1) 0.272 0.291
CP(t-l) 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2
G{t-1) -0.000005 -0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0




SD (t) -34.360 19.520
W(t) -0.055 -0.034
W(t-l) -0.055 -0.031
Y (t-1 ) -0.725 -0.691
CP(t) CP(t-1 ) -0.701 -0.355
CP(t-2) 0 . 0 1 1 -0.117
P(t) 0.043 0.008





X(t) R(t) -0.028 0.213
E(t)P(t+1 ) 0.044 0.070
E (t)P(t+2 ) 0.006 0.013
G(t) -0 . 0 0 2 -0.007
CP(t) -0.364 -0.701
SD (t) -11.364 -23.105
E(t)D(t+1 ) 0.229 0.194
E(t)P(t+1 ) P(t) -0.856 -0.871
P(t-l) -0.482 -0.288
E(t)D(t+l) D(t) -0.380 -0.290
D(t-1 ) -0.700 -0.517
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The 3SLS estimated coefficients, their standard errors 
(in parenthesis) and the Standard Error of the Estimate 
(SEE) (the square root of the sum of squared residuals 
divided by the degrees of freedom) for each equation are 
reported below. Note that the R2 and F statistics are not 
reported because 3SLS does not produce a valid estimate. In 
addition, since lagged dependent variables appear in all but 
the production function, the RATS computed Durbin-Watson 
statistic is not meaningful.
Yt =
.00389 + .3023Xt + l ^ e e x ^ !  - .2756CPt - .0884CPt_1 
(.0216) (.3908) (.3418) (.1830) (.2082)
+ 19.5184SDfc _ .03390Wt - .0307Wt_1 - .6907Yt_1 
(51.3983) (.0147) (.0170) (.1156)
SEE = .1394
SDt =
-.00003 + .0015Xt_1 + ,2907SDt_1 + .0025CPt_1 - .OOOOlGt.! 
(.00005) (.0009) (.1415) (.0004) (.00002)
SEE = .00031
CPt = -.0013 - -3546CPt_1 - .1174CPt_2 + .1001EtPt+1 +.0085Pt 
(.0166) (.1239) (.0731) (.0233) (.0162)
- . 0086G^._^ _ 63.0998SDt._i + .9890Xt_i - .7869EtDt 





xt = .0018 + .2131Rt + ,7003EtPt+1 + .0126EtPt+2 - .00673Gt
(.0126) (.2072) (.0169) (.0094) (.0030)
- .7007CPt - 23.1052SDt + .1944EtDt+1 
(.0890) (21.3994) (.1645)
SEE = .0849
EtPt+i = -.0242 - .8712Pt - .2878?^..!
(.1110) (.1331) (.1314)
SEE = .6286
EtDt+l = “ * 0 0 1 4  “ .2898Dt - .5167Dt_1 
(.0093) (.1318) (.1313)
SEE = .0526
As discussed in Chapter II, it is possible to reveal 
the parameters of the unobserved cost equation because its 
parameters (through cross equation restrictions) are 
functions of the estimated parameters. Assuming an interest 
rate of ten percent, the cost equation is:
C = -.92Rtxt + 5944.88 (D -S D k )  2 + 5.483 (CP^CPt.!) 2 
The above coefficients will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.
As a first step in the analysis of the results. Table
IV.2 provides a summary of those variables which have 
estimated coefficients that are statistically different than 
zero.
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TABLE IV. 2 
Statistical Significance









































From a statistical significance perspective, the Euler 
equation for purchased inputs performed the worst of the six 
equations estimated (i.e., only 3 of the 7 estimated 
coefficients were statistically different than zero). In 
fact, the large variance in this equation and the production 
function is suspected as the cause of problems encountered 
in additional SUR iterations where the convergence criteria 
is less than 0.1. That is, as its error was spread across 
other equations, the parameter estimates changed 
dramatically. This underscores the need to have properly 
specified models and good data to estimate multi-equation 
models.
Arguably more important than statistical significance 
is the economic significance of the estimated coefficients. 
The relationship between statistical significance and 
economic significance has most recently been discussed in a 
series of articles by Learner (1983); McAleer, Pagan and 
Volker (1985); and Learner (1985). As McCloskey (1985) 
points out, it is the responsibility of the researchers to 
identify whether or not an estimated coefficient is large or 
small, important or unimportant. Furthermore the overworked 
"t test" was intended to account for small sample bias - not 
to determine the economic significance of variables. In 
light of the above, and recognizing that correct signs do 
not alone imply economic significance, signs of the 
estimated coefficients will be evaluated.
Summarizing material from Chapter II, recall that the
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transition equation coefficients were all hypothesized to be 
greater than zero. However, it should be noted that the 
inputs may be conserving or depleting in terms of soil use. 
Since a rather crude index of inputs is utilized, it is 
difficult to apriori identify the expected sign. (Timmons 
maintains that they substitute for inherent soil 
productivity.) Finally, although soil depth is 
monotonically decreasing, we cannot unambiguously determine 
the sign of the soil depth variable on lagged values of 
itself.
The production function has a more straight forward 
interpretation of the expected signs. It is expected that 
since purchased inputs, lagged soil management and soil 
depth are all normal factors of production, a positive 
change in their use would illicit a positive change in 
yield. Contemporaneous soil management should have a 
negative sign because by definition raising it will lower 
adjusted yields. In addition, since weather is measured as 
the sum of the absolute deviation from average rainfall, and 
given the assumption in Section 11.5.3, the expected sign of 
weather is negative. Finally, because high prior yields may 
deplete the soil, the sign on lagged yield is negative.
With respect to the soil management equation, if 
expected price is taken parametrically, then an increase in 
the price received would be soil conserving (see McConnell's 
results), and the demand for soil management (i.e. CP) would 
increase. As such one would expect positive signs.
Furthermore, a lower soil depth increases the demand for CP 
because a lower soil depth increases user costs. In 
addition, the sign on purchased inputs will be negative if 
soil management and X are substitutes. The expected sign on 
expected debt is difficult to explain, but the underlying 
mathematics suggest that it is negative. All the 
coefficients in the cost equation are expected to be 
positive, given the discussion in Chapter II.
In the input demand equation it is expected that the 
sign on R will be negative, and the sign on prices will be 
positive. Based on reasoning symmetrical to the soil 
management equation, the signs on SD and CP are both 
negative. Finally, expected debt may be positively 
correlated with the demand for inputs insomuch as an 
expected increase in debt may be met with additional inputs 
in the current period. However, as with the soil management 
equation, the sign on debt is difficult to predict. Table
IV.2 summarizes the above material. In summary, including 
the indeterminate signs, the expected sign was realized 77 
percent of the time. In addition, note that 90 percent of 
those signs statistically different than zero were correctly 
anticipated. The above suggests that the estimated model 
performs rather well when judged against a theoretical 
benchmark like expected signs.
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TABLE IV. 3
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As a final topic in the discussion of the estimation 
results, the residuals will be analyzed. The residuals for 
each of the six estimated equations were evaluated in the 
following manner:
The residuals were plotted over time
The means and variances were computed 
The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelations 
were computed
The plots of the residuals do not show any suspicious 
patterns except that the mean of the soil depth equation 
appears to increase slightly, depending upon the sample 
period selected. All residual means were not statistically 
different than zero.
In addition, autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations for seven years were computed for each 
residual. Vandaale (1983) suggests the 99 percent 
confidence limits for autocorrelations can be approximated 
by +/- t/n*^. Using this test, none of the autocorrelations 
or partial autocorrelations were statistically different 
than zero. As such, it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors follow a white noise process.
Finally, covariance/correlation matrix for the error 




Y SD CP EP X D
Y .013 -.161 .413 -.642 .454 .237
SD . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 -.078 .078 -.105 .154
CP .004 - . 0 0 0 .008 .080 .923 .378
EP -.044 . 0 0 0 .004 .352 -.008 -.259
X .004 - . 0 0 0 .006 - . 0 0 0 .005 .408
D . 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 -.008 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2
The diagonal elements are the variances; the lower triangle
is the covariance; and the upper triangle is the 
correlation.
Note that after three iterations of the seemingly 
unrelated regression routine, there is a strong {greater 
than .7) correlation between the errors only in the input 
demand equation (X) and the soil management Euler equation 
(CP) . Efforts to exploit this correlation with further SUR 
iterations (by lowering the convergence criterion) results 
in dramatic changes in the estimated coefficients and 
failure to converge. This is most likely due to the errors 
resulting from the poor specification of the production 
function and purchased inputs Euler equation being spread 
across other equations. To circumvent this problem, the SUR 
technique was applied to all but the input demand equation, 
but the results did not change significantly.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS
The analysis of the estimated model will begin with a 
brief discussion of each of the structural equations and 
then proceed to a section where several hypotheses presented 
in the literature review section are empirically evaluated.
A discussion of policy analysis is also provided.
V. 1 The Structural Equations
V.1.1 Transition Equation
As displayed in the previous chapter, the soil depth 
transition equation had only two variables that were 
statistically significant, lagged values of itself and soil 
management. The government cost sharing variable had a 
negative sign but it was not statistically different than 
zero. The positive sign on the purchased inputs variable 
suggests that these inputs can enhance the soil resource. 
Whether this means that they actually reduce erosion rates 
or they substitute for qualitative variables is unclear. The 
estimated elasticities reveal that soil depth is relatively
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inelastic to changes in inputs, soil management and 
especially to government cost sharing.
Note that with data that has been logged and twice 
differenced, the coefficients may be interpreted as the 
change in percentage change, or the change in elasticity, 
whereas the slope coefficients for a logged and once 
differenced data set can be interpreted as measures of 
elasticity. If the stationarity of the first differencing 
is close to that of the second differencing, then the 
estimated coefficients will not change. To check this, the 
model was run with once differenced data. By-in-large the 
coefficients were similar to the twice differenced data, 
except for the coefficients on soil depth. As such, for 
expository purposes the term elasticity will be used to 
describe the relationship measured by the coefficients 
estimated with twice differenced data.
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TABLE V.l






X ft 1 H .002 3.4 .01
SDt-i .291* .2 .06
O *0 ft 1 M .002 10.2 .02
Gt-i .00001 37.8 .0004
* Statistically different than zero at 90% level
of confidence.
Table V.l displays how the average yearly change in a 
variable influences soil depth. Overall the annual rate of 
soil depth change is not very sensitive to any of the 
independent variables, thus reflecting the slow rate at 
which soil depth declines. However, given the above data, 
the average annual change in soil management has twice the 
effect as an average annual change in purchased inputs.
One plausible explanation for the negative coefficient 
on the government variable is that cost sharing is directed 
more toward conservation practices like diversions and 
waterways. The installation of such practices would, in 
theory, allow the farmer to maintain or increase the 
intensity of his rotation; hence, it is possible to argue 
for government cost sharing having offsetting effects and an 
indeterminate influence on erosion rates. Another
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explanation for the negative sign on the government variable 
is that soil conservation efforts have been targeted toward 
shallower soils, thus reducing their effect in aggregate.
V.l.2 Production Function
In terms of output elasticities, potato production 
appears to be rather responsive to changes in soil depth (a 
one percent decrease in soil depth results in a 19.5 percent 
drop in potato production). The following table shows how a 
one standard deviation change in inputs will affect output.
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Xt .302 3.4 1.03
xt-l 1.738* 3.4 5.91
CPt -.276 1 0 . 2 2.81
CPt-l -.088 1 0 . 2 .90
SDt-l 19.518 0 . 2 3.90
wt -.034* 51.5 1.75
Wt- 1 -.031* 51.5 1.60
Yt- 1 -.691* 9.3 6.42
Statistically different than zero at 90% 
level of confidence.
As the information in Table V.2 indicates, output is 
most sensitive to lagged inputs and lagged output. That 
there is a positive carry-over effect associated with 
purchased inputs is not surprising. What is surprising is 
that it dominates the influence of contemporaneous outputs. 
Certainly inputs like pesticides (a large part of the crop 
budget) and fertilizer do have a carry-over effect, but that 
they have a larger influence than current applications on 
the variation in yields was unexpected. Soil depth 
(although not statistically significant) has an impact of 
the same order of magnitude as lagged inputs. This suggests
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that the technological relationships are sending a 
moderately strong signal to farmers concerning the 
importance of soil depth to production.
Finally, the impact on production by the lagged 
rotation (CP) is relatively minor. In fact both CP terms 
were not statistically different than zero. As such, the 
carry-over effects of a rotation change appear to be 
minimal.
V.l.3 Soil Management Factor Demand
The soil management Euler equation is the centerpiece 
of this research. The manner in which the factor demand 
equation for soil management was formulated allows the 
direct determination of the existence and nature of the 
decision rule’s stability. The soil management difference 
equation takes the following form (holding all other 
variables constant):
CPt = Z^CPt_! + Z2CPt _ 2 
The solution to this difference equation is:
yt _ 7 t 1 , n t — 2x - Zjx + Z2X
where CPfc = xt 
which reduces to:
* 2 - ZlX - Z2 = 0 
Using the quadratic formula, the roots of the difference 
equation are:
X 1 = (-Zi + (Zi2 ~ 4z2)-5)/2 
x2 = ("Zl - (Zi2 " 4Z2)-5)/2
-83-
The estimated values for Z1 and Z2 are -.354 and -.117, 
hence the roots of the difference equation are:
= .208 
x2 = -.562
Since the absolute value of both roots is less than unity, 
and the sign on the larger root is negative, the equilibrium 
path is characterized by dampened oscillations. However, by 
ignoring the fact that EtPfc+l is also a function of 
and CPt_2 ' coefficients on CPt _ 2  and CPt _ 2 are
misrepresented. After substituting the subjective 
expectations for EfcPt+ ,^ the Z^ and z2 terms in the soil 
management difference equation become -.16 and .19, 
respectively. The roots of the soil management decision 
rule are now complex, but since -Z1 < if the rule is still 
stable. Using the following formula (Sargent 1979):
2 pi/(cos-l(Zl/(2-(z2)-5)))
The period of the oscillations can be computed. For the 
soil management decision rule the period is 7.2 years. In 
sum, the soil management decision rule is stable and 
features dampened oscillations.
The estimated sign on purchased inputs is positive 
(but not statistically significant). A positive coefficient 
suggests that purchased inputs and soil management, as 
measured here, are not substitutes. However, unlike the 
equation of motion, government cost sharing is statistically 
different than zero. The sign of the government variable is 
consistent with the discussion in the transition equation
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section where it is suggested that cost sharing might 
substitute structural practices {e.g. diversions) for soil 
management practices (e.g. rotations). In addition, the 
negative sign on soil depth indicates that the lower the 
soil depth, the greater the demand for soil management.
This can be interpreted as meaning that much of the highly 
productive soil has been eroded away and the subsoil that 
remains is vitally important in the optimal decision rule.
In short, the profit maximizing rule tells the farmer to 
reduce the intensity of his potato rotation in highly eroded 
soils. This is particularly true in areas where there is no 
land which can be brought into production.
The sign on expected price agrees with the theoretical 
sign (higher expected future prices reduce the soil use 
rate). This result makes intuitive sense because as 
expected prices increase, the user cost increases. A higher 
user cost implies that less of the resource will be used, 
hence higher prices are resource conserving.
Finally, the debt variable coefficient suggests that 
higher debt implies better conservation. The causal 
relationship here may be that as debt increases, the farmer 
cannot afford to plant as many acres of potatoes; hence his 
rotation becomes less intensive and therefore his soil 
management is improved.
The following table displays the sensitivity of soil 
management to changes in the independent variables.
-85-







CPt-l -.355* 1 0 . 2 3.62
CPt- 2 -.117 1 0 . 2 1.19
Pt .008 49.0 .39
EtPt+l .1 0 0 * 49.0 4.90
Gt- 1 -.009* 37.8 .34
SDt-l 63.100* . 2 12.62
Xt- 1 .989 3.4 3.36
Dt -.787* 5.2 4.09
*
Statistically different than zero at 90 percent 
level of confidence.
Note that although the elasticity of the soil depth 
variable is an order of magnitude higher than the other 
elasticities, its effect on soil management on a 
year-to-year basis is about the same as many other 
variables. Interestingly enough, five variables have about 
the same impact on the soil management decision: Lagged
soil management, expected price, soil depth, inputs, and 
debt. Government cost sharing and current prices have the 
smallest impact. This suggests that providing the farmer 
with good information about the rate of soil loss will help 
the farmer conserve soil. However the impact of such
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technical assistance can be diluted by the impacts of other 
variables. This provides quantitative support for the 
contention that a farmer operates within a complex 
environment which sends him a variety of contradictory 
signals concerning conservation. To ignore these 
relationships is to place unrealistic expectations on the 
effects of technical assistance.
The soil management decision rule affords an 
opportunity to investigate just how the estimated model can 
accommodate the Lucas Critique. In order to better focus on 
the Lucas Critique, assume that the only variable that 
changes is government cost sharing, Gt. The simplified soil 
management equation can then be written as:
CPt = -.001 - .3 5 0 ? ^  - .12CPt _ 2 + .10EtPt + 1  - •009Gt_1 
Conventional policy analysis would suggest that if 
government cost sharing were to increase by 38 percent, the 
level of conservation would fall .34 percent. Notice, 
however, that government cost sharing is one of the items in 
the information set used to form subjective expectations 
about future prices. See the appendix for a display of the 
first stage least squares regression results which are the 
subjective expectations. Again, to simplify matters, assume 
no change in the variables except for Gt. The subjective 
expectation becomes:
^ t P f i U t )  = - * 016 - -2 1 7 G t 
Hence the actual change in expected price caused by a change
in government cost sharing is -10.64. If expected price
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changes by -10.64 percent, then the level of conservation 
will fall by (-10.04)(.10), or .79 percent. Notice that the 
total change in soil management predicted by this model is 
1.13 percent, not .34 percent. This is a change 3.3 times 
as great as would be predicted through conventional policy 
analysis. (Just as Muth indicated: traditional models
understate the change in variables.) Recall that addressing 
the Lucas Critique requires the estimation of the invariant 
structural parameters. This has been accomplished by 
estimating not only parameters of the production function 
and the transition equation, but also the parameters of the 
farmer's subjective expectations formulation process.
This sort of reasoning can be extended to all the 
variables and as such Table V.3 is transformed to:
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TABLE V. 4
Soil Management Equation Elasticities with 
Subjective Expectations Incorporated
Average Percent Change
Variable Elasticity Percent Change in Soil Management
cpt-l -.355 1 0 . 2 -3.62 + 1.97 = -1.65
CPt- 2 -.117 1 0 . 2 -1.19 +
*
3.13 = 1.94
Pt .008 49.0 .39 - 5.39* = -5.00
EtPt+l . 1 0 0 49.0 4.90*
Gt- 1 .009 37.8 -.34* - .79 = -1.13
SDt-l 63.100 . 2 12.62* - 1.43 = 11.19
Xt- 1 .989 3.4 3.36 + .31 = 3.05
Dt -.787 5.2 -4.00* + . 8 8 = -3.21
*
** Statistically different than zero effects.
The first figure is from Table V.3, and the second 
figure is the expected price contribution.
The largest influence of incorporating the subjective 
expectations into the decision rule is found in the twice 
lagged soil management and current price variables. Both 
switch sign, and the magnitude of the price effect increases 
substantially. In short, caution must be exercised in 
predicting the effects of changes in variables that form 
part of the farmer's information set.
V.1.4 Purchased Inputs
One interesting result found in the input demand
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equation is that the price of purchased inputs (although 
positive) has no statistical influence on the demand for 
purchased inputs. Ignoring any data limitations, this 
suggests that farmers' demand for inputs is price inelastic. 
In addition, although it also lacks statistical 
significance, the coefficient on soil depth is interesting 
because it suggests that the shallower the soil, the greater 
the application of purchased inputs. This is entirely 
plausible if soil depth is "augmented" by purchased inputs, 
which the coefficient on soil depth in the transition 
equation suggests.
Like the soil management equation, the government cost 
sharing variable is negative and statistically different 
than zero. This indicates that increasing government cost 
sharing reduces the per acre application of inputs. This 
may be a result of government cost sharing increasing the 
proportion of potatoes grown: assuming an upper limit on 
total borrowing, purchase of inputs may not proportionally 
increase as much as the increase in potato acreage. The 
result is lower input levels per acre.
The following table summarizes the elasticity 
relationships in the purchased input demand equation.
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TABLE V. 5




% Change in 
Demand for Inputs
Rt .213 2 . 2 2.51
Etpt+ 1 .070* 49.0 3.43
Etpt+ 2 .013 49.0 .64
Gt -.007* 37.8 -.99
CPt
*
-.701 1 0 . 1
COo•r*1
SDt -23.105 . 2 -4.60
EtDt+l .194 5.2 1 . 0 0
Statistically different than zero at 90 percent
levels of confidence.
The effect of expected prices on the demand for 
purchased inputs was as anticipated: Higher future prices
imply greater application of inputs. This result fits with 
results obtained in the production function where the 
carry-over effect of inputs made a substantial contribution 
to production.
Expected debt has a positive influence on the purchase 
of inputs. Such a relationship makes sense in light of the 
large carry-over effect of inputs. Under these conditions 
it would appear to be rational for a farmer to increase 
input this year when, he believes debt will increase next 
year.
Finally, it should be noted that like the soil
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management decision rule there are expectational terms in 
the input decision rule. As such, the subjective 
expectation was substituted into the input decision rule and 
the total effects of various variables were recomputed.
Based upon the information in Table V.5, the demand for 
purchased inputs is dominated by expected price, soil 
management (rotation) and the soil depth.
V.1.5 Cost Equation
Again one of the interesting features of this 
evaluation is that the cross equation restrictions can be 
used to identify unobserved relationships. Recall that the 
marginal cost of two of the cost components were estimated 
to be positive. Perhaps the most revealing coefficients are 
those on the optimal soil depth variable and the cost of 
adjusting soil management. The analysis begins with a 








Rt*t -.92 7.48 6 . 8 8
(D-SDK) 2 5944.88 10.24 60,875.57
(CPfCPt-l) 2 5.483 104.04 570.45
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Clearly with the assumptions about K developed 
earlier, the cost equation is dominated by deviations from 
the optimal soil depth for borrowing purposes. As land 
values fall, K falls and the effect of the soil depth-debt 
term increases. If, on the other hand, lending institutions 
allow high debt to equity ratios (for example, 1.0), then K 
increases and the effect of the second cost term falls. The 
unusually large magnitude of the coefficient on the soil 
depth-debt component may be due to errors in the estimated 
coefficients. In addition, the desired debt equity ratio 
and land values may be in error.
The third term indicates that altering the rotation 
does have, as suggested in the model development, a positive 
influence on costs. This provides some insight into why 
farmers might be resistant to recommendations by 
conservationists to change their rotation.
Finally, the implications of a negative marginal cost 
are that total costs will fall given an increase in R or X. 
This does not make economic sense and is most likely an 
artifact of the positive sign on the input price coefficient 
in the input demand equation, which, it should be noted, is 
not statistically different than zero.
V.2 Examining the Literature
In this section a number of hypotheses drawn from the 
literature review are examined. The first item considered
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is a fundamental relationship seen throughout the agronomic 
literature: As soil depth declines, yields fall. The null
hypothesis is that sg is equal to zero, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that Sg ig greater than zero. The
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90 percent level
of confidence. The reason may be that the soils in 
Aroostook County may have eroded to the point where the 
highly productive topsoil is lost and, as such, the subsoil 
is so limited in its contribution to production that we 
should expect that Sg = 0. In short, the fact that the 
coefficient on soil depth is not statistically different 
than zero supports the argument for "S" shaped soil 
production functions. In such functions the soil
depth-yield function takes its form from the logic that very
thick or very shallow soils are insensitive to losses. It 
is only when erosion is occurring in the transition from a 
deep to a shallow soil that the marginal effect of soil is 
significant. Such a physical relationship could limit the 
opportunity cost associated with additional depletion of the 
soil resource. This in turn may explain, in part, some of 
the resistance to the adoption of conservation in Aroostook 
County or anywhere where soils have been severely eroded.
Recall that Ervin and Ervin (1982) concluded that 
there was a weak link between conservation and government 
programs. The null hypothesis here is that in the soil 
management factor demand equation, government cost sharing 
should have no influence, i.e. Hq: Z5=0> In fact# at the
-94-
90% level of confidence, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This is contrary to the expectations of not only Ervin and 
Ervin, but also many others, including Collins and Headley 
(1983). However it must be noted that the size of the 
impact is relatively small, which may be interpreted as a 
weak linkage. As such, although the null hypothesis is 
rejected, it must be recognized that the influence is small 
and negative.
Ervin and Ervin also suggested that high debt inhibits 
farmers from adopting conservation. The formal alternative 
hypothesis would be that the sign on debt is equal to zero 
in the soil management equation and the alternative 
hypothesis is that the coefficient is less than zero. The 
estimated model rejects the null hypothesis (i.e., Zg = o) . 
Here is a case where even when the subjective expectations 
are incorporated and the effect of debt does not change. In 
short, the sign on debt in the soil management decision rule 
is negative and therefore the model agrees with the 
commonly-held proposition that increased debt makes it 
harder for farmers to adopt conservation.
McConnell concludes from his qualitative model that 
higher future prices will lower the current rate of soil 
loss. The estimated coefficient on expected price supports 
this hypothesis, although the magnitude of the elasticity is 
rather small.
Finally, Osteen suggests that price stability (Delta 
Etpt+ 1 = 0 ) reduces the need to rotate and hence it has an
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adverse effect on soil conservation. Analyzing this will 
allow us to demonstrate the multiple equilibria quality of 
rational expectations models. First we reproduce the soil 
management decision rule and the subjective expectation of 
future prices:
CPt = .001 - .35 0 ? ^  - .12CPt _ 2 + .10Et |Pt + 1
+ .008Pt _ 63.10SDt_! - .lOX^! - .008Gt - .77Dfc (V.l) 
Etpt+1 = “ - 0 2  + -01Wt + .OeWt.! + 10.81Rt - 1.8. Rt_i
- 1.01Pt - .71Pt_1 - .22Gt -.13Gt_1 + 15.48Xt._i
- .44Xfc_ 2 + 71.59SDt_1 + 1.94CPt _ 1 + 3.06CPt_2
+ 24.32GPt_1 + .79GPt _ 2 + 10.36Dt - 23.36Dt_1 (V.2)
Recall that the independent variables in the above 
equation are the information set and form the subjective 
expectation.
By setting a price for potatoes, the expected price 
term drops out of equation (V.l). But more than that will 
happen. Notice that if the expectation equation (equation
V.2) is substituted in equation (V.l), not only the level of 
conservation changes, but the equilibrium path will also 
change because the CPfc_ 1 an<j cPt- 2  terms from the 
expectation equation drop out. In this case the amplitude 
of the oscillations will be reduced. In short, Osteen's 
proposition is true: the need to change rotation is




In Chapter I the argument was made that soil erosion 
is perceived by society to be a serious problem. This 
problem was described in two ways. First, there is the 
concern that the farmer's rate of soil use is greater than 
the rate of erosion desired by society (T). Second, there 
is the belief that farmers have poor information about the 
fundamental erosion productivity relationships; consequently 
federal, state and local governments directly subsidize the 
installation of many conservation practices, while also 
providing technical assistance to farmers to help them 
better understand the effects of erosion.
In addition, supply response models were identified as 
having a great deal of potential in describing the essence 
of a farmer's optimal decision rule for soil conservation. 
The reasoning here is that of the six parameters in the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation, the rainfall, soil erodibility 
and slope factors are fixed. In addition, since the
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application of structural measures is fairly constant over 
time in Aroostook County, the conservation practice and 
length of slope factors can also be viewed as constants. As 
such, the critical variable in soil management is the C, or 
cover, factor. Because the primary means of controlling the 
C factor in Aroostook County is through crop rotation 
(rather than changes in tillage or cover crops), the 
rotation selected by the farmer is a good proxy for soil 
management. Since soil management is closely allied with the 
choice of how many acres of potatoes to plant, there is a 
strong linkage between soil management decisions and supply 
response models.
Recent work by Eckstein in the area of supply response 
models has shown that the linear quadratic rational 
expectations models fit the data as well as adaptive
expectation models. And, although they are observationally
equivalent to adaptive models, the advantage of rational 
expectations models is that they provide a richer 
interpretation of the coefficients. Furthermore, the 
cyclical cobweb behavior observed in commodity markets can 
be explained by the characteristics of the model rather than 
by the assumption that farmers make systematic errors in 
their expectations.
The literature review indicated that only recently has 
research began to apply dynamic models to evaluate soil 
erosion. Moreover, much of the research is qualitative or
deterministic. Furthermore it failed to model the
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environment in which farmers make decisions. In short, it 
did not adequately describe a decision making environment 
which sends a host of constantly changing, contradictory and 
complementary signals. The result is soil management 
decisions which are optimal under one set of conditions may 
be sub-optimal under another set of conditions.
The contribution of this dissertation is to combine 
the elements of optimal control, supply response, and 
rational expectations to formulate and then estimate the 
farmer's optimal, time invariant soil management decision 
rule. In the process of analyzing the nature of the 
decision rule, an accessible rational expectations 
estimation procedure was implemented and various hypotheses 
about the soil resource were examined.
In order to gain a measure of understanding of the 
relationship between society's goal of intergenerational 
equity (i.e., erosion rates of T) and the optimal private 
rate of erosion, compare the following decision rules. The 
first is the T decision rule:
CPt = CPT = .288 
The soil conservationist who uses the T value as a planning 
goal is actually recommending that the farmer put 28.8 
percent of his crop into potatoes, year after year.
Contrast this with the decision rule developed in this 
research:
CPt = 20 + zlCPt-l + z2CPt-2 + z3pt + z4Etpt+l 
+ z5Gt-l + z6 SDt-l + z7xt-l + z8 °t
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Notice that a number of variables are allowed to influence 
the farmer's soil management decision and that the optimal 
CP will vary, perhaps greatly, from year to year. By not 
allowing the farmer to adjust the profit maximizing soil 
management level to take into account these other variables, 
the soil conservationist implicitly forces a cost on the 
farmer. In fact, even if the average soil management 
decision rule results in a rotation of 28.8 percent oats, 
the T rule will produce lower income. The policy 
implication here is clear. Soil conservationists must 
recognize that farmers make decisions in a complex 
environment and constraining them to a rotation that 
produces an erosion rate of T is income depressing. This, 
then, contributes to a farmer's resistance to applying 
conservation practices. One way to resolve this problem is 
for the soil conservationist to emphasize (perhaps through 
increased subsidies) structural practices that reduce 
erosion by changing the slope length factor or tillage 
practices, and then let the farmer make decisions about his 
rotation. Furthermore, an evaluation of the C factor 
requires that long term averages be used rather than current 
rotations.
The second concern raised involves the extent to which 
farmers understand the consequences of erosion. Part of the 
soil conservationist's role is to educate farmers about how 
the loss of soil affects his production. It was found that 
soil depth does affect the optimal soil management decision.
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This suggests that, in aggregate, farmers not only observe 
the effects of soil loss, but they incorporate that 
knowledge into their decision making. This supports 
McConnell's comment that:
While there may be considerable work which 
attempts to develop the impact of soils on 
productivity, it seems safe to conclude 
that farmers are knowledgeable in this 
regard; and that, in the absence of more 
knowledge of these relationships, we are not 
badly off by trusting our resources with 
those who must make a living from them.
(McConnell 1986, p. 743)
The model, however, is an aggregate model and as such does
not rule out individual farmers who do not understand the
technical relationship between productivity and soil loss.
Consequently there may still be need for educational
programs which outline the effects of erosion.
In conclusion, it is not necessary to resort to 
assumptions about farmer behavior which characterizes 
farmers as ignorant of or misinformed about the physical 
effects of erosion. In essence they are better 
characterized as making decisions concerning soil management 
in an environment which provides incentives for rational 
farmers, in a profit maximizing setting, to erode soil at 
rates greater than the socially desirable rate.
Furthermore, recommending soil management practices that 
restrict the farmer's ability to respond to the information 
they receive will reduce their net income. If society 
values conserving soil and economic efficiency, it makes
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little sense for society to subsidize the production of 
commodities on one hand, then subsidize measures to 
ameliorate problems caused by these same production 
enhancement programs. Moreover, as McConnell points out 
"...I do not think there is any convincing reason that 
farmers will do a worse job than anyone else in calculating 
the user cost of soil loss when markets function well." 
(McConnell 1986, p. 744) As such, national policy on soil 
conservation should focus first on obtaining a better 
understanding of the conservation decision (which may vary 
across identifiable groups), and then formulate and 
administer policy which improves the transmission of and 
response to conservation signals. However, it must be 
underscored that the focus here has been on the private, 
on-site, effects of erosion. Consequently this analysis has 
explicitly ignored the off-site externalities of erosion. It 
is here that serious market failure can occur and this is 
where it may be possible to find rationale for government 
intervention. But even in implementing policy to reduce 
off-site effects, it is critical that the private decision 
rule of the farmer be clearly understood.
VI. 2 Recommendations for Future Research
The use of models of optimizing agents like the one 
developed in this research have potential for further 
application in analyzing the soil resource base. The 1985
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Farm Bill contains three soil conservation provisions: 
conservation compliance, which prevents farmers from 
obtaining federal program benefits unless their highly 
erodible land is adequately protected; Sodbuster, which 
penalizes farmers who bring new land into production; and 
the conservation reserve program, which pays farmers to 
retire highly erodible land. Better models are needed not 
only to help formulate such policy, but to fine tune it 
during the development of implementation rules.
In building these models, very careful attention 
should be paid to identifying the farmer's information set 
and how proposed policy interventions might interact with 
the information set. In addition, the modeling approach 
pursued here should be expanded to other areas, other crops 
and multiple crops and various groups of farmers. Perhaps 
the most serious constraints on future research is the 
adequacy of data (multi-billion dollar policy making 
deserves better data), and the qualification of off-site 
effects.
Finally, further research on the optimum state of 
conservation is warranted because, as stated in the preface, 
it is "...helpful as an organizing principle in analyzing 
the result of economic forces which influence 




— The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) was developed 
in 1958 and is comprised of two quantitative factors and four 
qualitative factors. The USLE is:
A = RKLSCP
where A is the average annual soil loss; R is the rainfall 
and runoff erosivity index; K is the soil erodibility 
factor; L is the slope-length factor; S is the 
slope-steepness factor; C is the cover and management 
factor; and P is the cultural practice factor (Wischmeier 
1976).
The USLE can be used by soil conservation planners to 
predict soil loss from sheet and rill erosion. The USLE is 
literally an estimate of soil movement: the soil is not 
necessarily lost.
2 /— This is not to argue that rainfall is optimal, but 
rather that potato productioin will migrate to climatic 
zones where average rainfall most nearly meets the water 
requirements of the potato plant. As such, as rainfall 
patterns deviate from this average, yield will be 
depressed.
—  ^ The following cost function
C = (a+b) [ (r1 ar2b) (Aaabb)-1] < a+b* 
is the dual of the following production function
q = AXjax2b
where a and b > 0 , x.»s are inputs, r-j's are input prices, 
and q is output. Clearly the parameters and functional 
form of the production function establish the form of the 
cost function. In the soil resource model a cost function 
is not specified. Instead, a cost equation is 
hypothesized. In addition the functional forms develped 
are ment to be local approximations of the underlying 




FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 





YEAR ADJYLD ADJ1N CP NTHR SD1LD RINPRI RP0TPR1 RACP DEBT
1950.00 168.9600 0.6489 0.4133 4.03 11.570 341.193 1.7B9 0.900 3555.55
1951.00 116.8831 0.6277 0.5671 4.15 11.554 350.900 3.895 0.807 33^ 4.65
1952.00 136.2000 0.6085 0.4000 4.52 11.546 344.654 2.730 0.765 3380.24
1953.00 138.2500 0.5595 0.4167 2.80 11.530 319.600 0.924 0.699 3329.68
1954.00 115.2619 0.5476 0.4286 7.06 11.515 316.770 2.671 0.680 3483.25
1955.00 146.3096 0.5649 0.4100 1.02 11.500 312.968 2.207 0.704 3870.77
1956.00 175.4118 0.558B 0.3824 1.35 11.484 307.125 1.486 0.687 3982.57
1957.00 156.8963 0.5311 0.4315 3,09 11.467 304.864 2.550 0.630 3943.76
1958.00 157.7716 0.5431 0.3664 4.64 11.453 304.850 1.282 0.627 4064.58
1959.00 148.9696 0.5391 0.3870 4.51 11.434 304.696 2.658 0.618 4214.05
1960.00 154.4174 0.5550 0.3257 2.16 11.417 298.760 1.533 0.626 4528.38
1961.00 179.2857 0.5862 0.2759 2.69 11.386 296.B75 1.261 0.654 4972.76
1962.00 185.62B0 0.5652 0.2947 4.60 11.357 298.013 1.347 0.624 5021.54
1963.00 1B9.6923 0.5897 0.2974 6.46 11.331 297.710 2.105 0.643 5534.68
1964.00 197.7320 0.5773 0.2784 4.60 11.305 290.635 4.144 0.621 5B67.21
1965.00 174.8431 0.5392 0.2598 3.37 11.276 293.122 2.497 0.571 5498.50
1966.00 189.6000 0.5400 0.2100 4.41 11.243 297.325 1.749 0.556 5493.60
1967.00 188.9648 0.5377 0.1910 2.83 11.205 290.000 1.360 0.538 5810.47
196B.00 187.7577 0.5361 0.2010 2.01 11.158 278.311 1.775 0.514 6119.37
1969.00 173.7624 0.5050 0.2030 1.66 11.115 275.046 2.004 0.460 6430.70
1970.00 178.5000 0.5100 0.2350 4.59 11.072 269.132 1.702 0.439 6492.09
1971.00 198.4211 0.5263 0.2368 2.17 11.035 270.404 1.401 0.434 7061.34
1972.00 183.8674 0.5359 0.2541 2.99 11.000 280.128 3.272 0.428 7938.57
1973.00 158.0769 0.5385 0.2418 4.39 10.968 318.557 5.447 0.405 8642.22
1974.00 194.6524 0.5294 0.2406 1.53 10.933 325.660 1.963 0.358 8677.04
1975.00 156,9591 0.5673 0.2865 2.70 10.898 327.543 3.753 0.352 9482.02
1976.00 17B.181B 0.6429 0.2468 6.38 10.B70 327.859 2.903 0.377 10569.14
1977.00 174.8148 0.6173 0.2346 8.56 10.836 319.008 1.851 0.340 10399.23
1978.00 157.3333 0.6242 0.2788 2.96 10.800 321.392 1.975 0.319 10343.79
1979.00 171.9565 0.6584 0.2795 3.08 10,771 331.187 1.495 0.303 11582.00
1980.00 162.0779 0.6753 0.2987 2.41 10.742 323.744 2.938 0.274 11714.8B
1981.00 171.0968 0.6581 0.3161 6.04 10.716 313.077 1.652 0,242 11321.73
1982.00 175.5195 0.655B 0.3052 2.16 10.692 299.204 1.159 0.227 11074.27
1983.00 163.4783 0.7029 0.3043 3.97 10.667 296.247 1.977 0.236 12161.40
AVE 167.B7 0.58 0.31 3.70 11.17 307.28 2.22 0.52 6761.94
STD 20.57 0.05 0.08 1.71 0.29 20.38 0.97 0.18 2B94.65
VAR 422.92 0.00 0.01 2.94 0.09 415.16 0.94 0.03 8379018
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♦THIS PROGRAM PRODUCES STATIONARY DATA SERIES 
♦AND THEN RUNS DISSERTATION MODEL 
♦FILE NAME: DSTATN12.PGM 
♦CREATED JULY 21, 1986 
♦REVISED AUG 5, 1986 
♦REVISED AUG 13, 1986 
♦REVISED AUG 14, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 10, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 11, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 21, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 23, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 26, 1986 
♦REVISED NOV 27, 1986
WITH RESTRICTIONS
ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE SPEC OF Y & X
NEW SPECIFICATION ALL STRUC EQNS
SEARCH FOR CONVERGENCE
ONE LAG TRANSITION EQUATION
Set up Calendar*
CALENDAR 1950 1 1
*
♦ Allocate Space for data
0 1983,1
This section of RATS code inputs data 








OPEN(BINARY) DATA C:DISSL030.WKS 
*
CLEAR ADJYLD ADJIN CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RPOTPRI RACP $ 
RDIST EP POTPROD DEBT 
*
DATA(FORMAT=WKS,ORG=OBS) 1950,1 1983,1 ADJYLD ADJIN $ 
CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RPOTPRI RACP POTPROD DEBT 
*
SET EP 1950,1 1983,1 = RPOTPRI(T)
SET(SCRATCH) RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 = RPOTPRI(T-l)
*
print 1 34 ADJYLD ADJIN CP WTHR SOILD RINPRI RACP $









SET ADJYLD 1951,1 1983,1
SET ADJIN 1951,1 1983,1
SET CP 1951,1 1983,1













SET SOILD 1951,1 1983,1 =
SET RINPRI 1951,1 1983,1 =
SET RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 
SET RACR 1951,1 1983,1 
SET EP 1951,1 1983,1
SET POTPROD 1951,1 1983,1 
SET DEBT 1951,1 1983,1 
*
print 1 1 0  adjyld 
*
*
*DEMEAN THE DATA 
*
DIFFERENCE ADJYLD 1951,1 1983,1 0 ADJYLD 
DIFFERENCE ADJIN 1951,1 1983,1 0 ADJIN 
DIFFERENCE CP 1951,1 1983,1 0 CP 
DIFFERENCE WTHR 1951,1 1983,1 0 WTHR 
DIFFERENCE SOILD 1951,1 1983,1 0 SOILD 
DIFFERENCE RINPRI 1951,1 1983,1 0 RINPRI 
DIFFERENCE RPOTPRI 1951,1 1983,1 0 RPOTPRI 
DIFFERENCE RACP 1951,1 1983,1 0 RACP 
DIFFERENCE EP 1951,1 1983,1 0 EP 
DIFFERENCE POTPROD 1951,1 1983,1 0 POTPROD 
DIFFERENCE DEBT 1951,1 1983,1 0 DEBT

















































ADJYLD 1952,1 1983,1 1 ADJYLD 
ADJIN 1952,1 1983,1 1 ADJIN 
CP 1952,1 1983,1 1 CP 
WTHR 1952,1 1983,1 1 WTHR 
SOILD 1952,1 1983,1 1 SOILD 
RINPRI 1952,1 1983,1 1 RINPRI 
RPOTPRI 1952,1 1983,1 1 RPOTPRI 
RACP 1952,1 1983,1 1 RACP 
EP 1952,1 1983,1 1 EP 
POTPROD 1952,1 1983,1 1 POTPROD 
DEBT 1952,1 1983,1 1 DEBT
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* TAKE SECOND DIFFERENCE
*
DIFFERENCE ADJYLD 1953,1 1983,1 1 ADJYLD 
DIFFERENCE ADJIN 1953,1 1983,1 1 ADJIN 
DIFFERENCE CP 1953,1 1983,1 1 CP 
DIFFERENCE WTHR 1953,1 1983,1 1 WTHR 
DIFFERENCE SOILD 1953,1 1983,1 1 SOILD 
DIFFERENCE RINPRI 1953,1 1983,1 1 RINPRI 
DIFFERENCE RPOTPRI 1953,1 1983,1 1 RPOTPRI 
DIFFERENCE RACP 1953,1 1983,1 1 RACP 
DIFFERENCE EP 1953,1 1983,1 1 EP 
DIFFERENCE POTPROD 1953,1 1983,1 1 POTPROD 
DIFFERENCE DEBT 1953,1 1983,1 1 DEBT 
*
PRINT 3 32 ADJYLD ADJIN CP SOILD WTHR RINPRI RPOTPRI $ 
RACP EP POTPROD DEBT
STATISTICS ADJYLD 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS ADJIN 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS CP 1953,1 1983,1
STATISTICS WTHR 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS SOILD 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS RINPRI 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS RACP 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS RPOTPRI 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS EP 1953,1 1983,1
STATISITCS POTPROD 1953,1 1983,1 
STATISTICS DEBT 1953,1 1983,1
*SET NEXT PERIOD DEBT VARIABLE
SET(SCRATCH) DEBT 1953,1 1982,1 = DEBT(T+l)
* DEFINE FIRST STAGE 
EQUATION 1 ADJYLD
♦CONSTANT -ADJIN 0 1 -CP 0 1 -SOILD 1 1 -WTHR 0 1 $ 
-ADJYLD 1 1 
EQUATION 2 SOILD
♦CONSTANT -ADJIN 1 1 -SOILD 1 1 -CP 1 1 -RACP 1 1 
EQUATION 3 CP
♦CONSTANT -CP 1 2 RPOTPRI EP -ADJIN 1 1 -RACP 1 1 $
-SOILD 1 1 -DEBT 1 1
EQUATION 4 EP
♦CONSTANT -RPOTPRI 0 1
EQUATION 6 ADJIN
♦CONSTANT -EP 0 -1 RINPRI RACP CP SOILD DEBT 
EQUATION 7 DEBT
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♦CONSTANT -WTHR 1 2 -RINPRI 0 1 -RPOTPRI 0 1 $
-CP 1 2 -POTPROD 1 2 -DEBT 1 2 -ADJYLD 1 1 -RACP 0 1 $  
-ADJIN 1 2 -SOILD 1 1
♦ADJYLD CP SOILD EP ADJIN DEBT
♦I ADJYLD I CP I SOILD I EP I ADJIN I DEBT


















CORRELATE SECYERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECSERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECCERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECPERR 1955,1 1982,1
SOILD 1955,1 1982,1 SECSERR
CP 1955,1 1982,1 SECCERR
EP 1955,1 1982,1 SECPERR 
ADJIN 1955,1 1982,1 SECIERR







CROSS SECCERR SECPERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECYERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECSERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECCERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECPERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECIERR 1955,1 1982,1
CROSS SECCERR SECDERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES) 1
♦ SECYERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
♦ SECSERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
♦ SECCERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
♦ SECPERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES) 1
# SECIERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# SECDERR 1955,1 1982,1
#
CORRELATE SECYERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECSERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECCERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECPERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SECIERR 1955,1 1982,1 














































STATISTICS DERR 1955,1 1982,1
PLOT(DATES) 1
# YERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# SERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# CERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# PERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# INERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PLOT(DATES) 1
# DERR 1955,1 1982,1
#
CORRELATE YERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE SERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE CERR 1955,1 1982,1 
CORRELATE PERR 1955,1 1982,1
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CORRELATE INERR 1955,1 1982,1
CORRELATE DERR 1955,1 1982,1 
*
PARITAL YERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PARITAL SERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PARITAL CERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PARITAL PERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PARITAL INERR 1955,1 1982,1 
PARITAL DERR 1955,1 1982,1 
*
OLS (EQUATION=l) ADJYLD 1955,1 1982,1 
OLS (EQUATION*2) SOILD 1955,1 1982,1 
OLS (EQUATIONS) CP 1955,1 1982,1 
OLS(EQUATION=4) EP 1955,1 1982,1 
OLS (EQUATION=6 ) ADJIN 1955,1 1982,1 








FIRST STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS 
(Subjective Expectations)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 ADJYLD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 9
R**2 .87336672 RBAR**2 .62010016
SSR .12426365 SEE .11750350
DURBIN'-WATSON 1.54843339
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** *** *** ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -. 5903263E-02 .2364661E-01
2 WTHR 4 1 - . 9024408E—02 .3854099E-01
3 WTHR 4 2 -. 1593397E-01 .3546611E-01
4 RINPRI 6 0 -1.911137 .9803171
5 RINPRI 6 1 1.571785 1.063934
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 . 9446167E-01 .1009204
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 .1526143 .9746279E-01
8 RACP 8 0 -. 8932073E-02 .2956368E-01
9 RACP 8 1 -. 1397646E-01 .2770950E-01
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 1.146835 2.448304
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 -.2727444 .8277575
1 2 SOILD 5 1 -100.0232 86.79332
13 CP 3 1 -.2474252 .4840879
14 CP 3 2 -.1688385 .3505246
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 . 8440579E-01 2.949062
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 .1299353 .4043108
17 DEBT 1 2 1 .9631539 .7099098
18 DEBT 1 2 2 -.4292318 1.002945
19 ADJYLD 1 1 -.6415512 2.951467
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 3 _
FROM 1955- I UNTIL 1982-CP1 FREEDOM
R**2 88794830 RBAR**2 .66384489
SSR . 71707929E - 0 1 SEE .89261121E-01
DURBIN'-WATSON 1.56913280
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** ******* *** ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.5348933E-02 .1796307E—01
2 WTHR 4 1 -.1605181E-01 .2927753E-01
3 WTHR 4 2 .2591689E-01 . 2694171E—01
4 RINPRI 6 0 1.274738 .7446945
5 RINPRI 6 1 -.2738630 .8082140
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.3282933E-02 .7666383E-01
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 -.6689236E-01 .7403727E-01
8 RACP 8 0 -.5105732E-01 . 2245794E—01
9 RACP 8 1 -.4222204E-01 . 2104943E-01
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 5.002855 1.859846
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 -.6161290 .6288031
1 2 SOILD 5 1 -171.2998 65.93224
13 CP 3 1 -.4763511 .3677357
14 CP 3 2 .5720973 .2662748
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 7.906999 2.240244
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 .4676713 .3071333
17 DEBT 1 2 1 -.1996379 .5392805
18 DEBT 1 2 2 1.475842 .7618837
19 ADJYLD 1 1 -7.361011 2.242072
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5 SOILD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 9
R**2 .94383649 RBAR**2 .83150947
SSR , 27013338E1-06 SEE . 17324786E-03
DURBIN-WATSON 1.82753111
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.4261081E-04 . 3486471E-04
2 WTHR 4 1 -.1038936E-03 . 5682507E-04
3 WTHR 4 2 -.2129495E-05 .5229144E-04
4 RINPRI 6 0 .4216009E-02 .1445385E-02
5 RINPRI 6 1 .6938879E-02 .1568671E-02
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.5481232E-03 .1487977E-03
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 -.7527827E-03 .1436997E-03
8 RACP 8 0 -.6344127E-04 .435888 6E-04
9 RACP 8 1 -.7684368E-04 .4085505E-04
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 -.2231235E-02 . 3609794E-02
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 -.7920840E-03 . 1220451E-02
1 2 SOILD 5 1 .6140002 .1279686
13 CP 3 1 .5584053E-02 . 7137420E-03
14 CP 3 2 .1372142E-02 . 5168156E-03
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 -.3749035E—02 . 4348114E-02
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 -.1631429E-02 . 5961182E-03
17 DEBT 1 2 1 -.5580732E-02 . 1046695E-02
18 DEBT 1 2 2 -.3344396E-03 . 1478748E-02
19 ADJYLD 1 1 .4119962E-02 .4351661E-02
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 10 E









NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
★ * ★ ******* *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -. 1603628E-01
2 WTHR 4 1 -. 1008388E-01
3 WTHR 4 2 . 6097211E-01
4 RINPRI 6 0 10.81519
5 RINPRI 6 1 -1.806690
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 -1.107172
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 -.7135907
8 RACP 8 0 -.2167432
9 RACP 8 1 -.1291159
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 15.47584
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 -.4378178
1 2 SOILD 5 1 -71.59320
13 CP 3 1 1.935602
14 CP 3 2 3.069629
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 24.32289
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 .7891514
17 DEBT 1 2 1 1.707692
18 DEBT 1 2 2 10.36035


























DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 ADJIN
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 9
R**2 .84916745 RBAR**2 .54750234
SSR . 14443625E1-01 SEE .40060545E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.86242357
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** ******* *** *** ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 .5247029E-02 . 8061855E-02
2 WTHR 4 1 -.2802347E-02 . 1313980E-01
3 WTHR 4 2 6985843E-02 . 1209148E-01
4 RINPRI 6 0 -.3262793 .3342202
5 RINPRI 6 1 .1452281E-01 .3627278
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.1585999E-01 . 3440686E-01
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 .1697465E-02 . 3322805E-01
8 RACP 8 0 -.2096652E-02 . 1007916E-01
9 RACP 8 1 .4920572E-02 .9447019E-02
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 -.9047536 .8347019
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 -.1203539 .2822079
1 2 SOILD 5 1 25.24478 29.59050
13 CP 3 1 .6925346E-01 .1650404
14 CP 3 2 -.4470028E-01 .1195046
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 -.4801861 1.005425
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 -.4826416E-01 .1378419
17 DEBT 1 2 1 .6414944 .2420300
18 DEBT 1 2 2 .2000523 .3419347
19 ADJYLD 1 1 .3760604 1.006246
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 DEBT









SSR .15177802E1- 0 1 SEE .41066074E-01
DURBIN-WATSON 1.93020673
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** ******* *** * * * ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.2393385E-02 .8264209E-02
2 WTHR 4 1 . 1875254E-02 .1346962E-01
3 WTHR 4 2 . 8657720E-02 .1239498E-01
4 RINPRI 6 0 .1200909 .3426092
5 RINPRI 6 1 .5738418 .3718324
6 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.8398946E-01 .3527048E-01
7 RPOTPRI 7 1 -. 8078783E-01 .3406209E-01
8 RACP 8 0 -.1071113E-01 .1033215E-01
9 RACP 8 1 -.1564810E-01 .9684141E-02
1 0 ADJIN 2 1 .2273176 .8556532
1 1 ADJIN 2 2 .6796503E-01 .2892914
1 2 SOILD 5 1 -24.38978 30.33323
13 CP 3 1 .1594547 .1691829
14 CP 3 2 .5226452E-01 .1225042
15 POTPROD 1 1 1 1.019042 1.030662
16 POTPROD 1 1 2 -.2378612 .1413018
17 DEBT 1 2 1 -.3460960 .2481050
18 DEBT 1 2 2 .1992581 .3505173
19 ADJYLD 1 1 -1.098396 1.031503
SECOND STAGE REGRESSION
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SECOND STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
EQUATION 1
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 ADJYLD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 19
R**2 .68589153 RBAR**2 .55363533
SSR .30823069 SEE .12736824
DURBIN—WATSON 2.00217231
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** *** *** ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 .3305282E-02 . 2439065E-01
2 ADJIN 2 0 .1404220 .6164285
3 ADJIN 2 1 .9751911 .5465812
4 CP 3 0 -.3512677 .3084550
5 CP 3 1 -.3268418 .3501821
6 SOILD 5 1 -34.36273 86.70860
7 WTHR 4 0 -. 5515247E-01 .2590482E-01
8 WTHR 4 1 -. 5456704E-01 .2930441E-01
9 ADJYLD 1 1 -.7256809 .1926288
EQUATION 2 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5 





NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ******* *** *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -.3031882E-04
2 ADJIN 2 1 .1805888E-02
3 SOILD 5 1 .2724043
4 CP 3 1 .2402535E-02
5 RACP 8 1 -.9816573E-05
SOILD 
■ 1












DEPENDENT VARIABLE 3 










NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ******* *** *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -. 2496040E-02
2 CP 3 1 -.7007238
3 CP 3 2 . 1112271E-01
4 RPOTPRI 7 0 .4292092E-01
5 EP 1 0 0 .1162898
6 ADJIN 2 1 -.9037209
7 RACP 8 1 -.5638118E-02
8 SOILD 5 1 -144.3254
















DEPENDENT VARIABLE 10 EP





NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
* * * ******* *** *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 — .1729841E-01
2 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.8564470
3 RPOTPRI 7 1 -.4820829





















NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ******* *** *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 . 1575938E-02
2 EP 1 0 - 1 . 5891574E-02
3 EP 1 0 0 . 4415465E-01
4 RINPRI 6 0 -.2802137E-01
5 RACP 8 0 -. 1934824E-02
6 CP 3 0 -.3642097
7 SOILD 5 0 -11.38404















DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 







DEGREES OF FREEDOM 25
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ******* *** *** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 -. 1812189E-02
2 DEBT 1 2 1 -.3802137













DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 ADJYLD
PROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 19
R**2 .62365774 RBAR**2 .46519784
SSR .36929993 SEE .13941606
DURBIN-WATSON 2.09596743
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
*** *** *** ft*********** ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 .389 3016E-02 .2163012E-01
2 ADJIN 2 0 .3022994 .3908390
3 ADJIN 2 1 1.738609 .3418089
4 CP 3 0 -.2755961 .1829802
5 CP 3 1 -.8841991E-01 .2082537
6 SOILD 5 1 19.51846 51.39835
7 WTHR 4 0 -.3386603E-01 .1468970E-01
8 WTHR 4 1 -.3069304E-01 .1696819E-01
9 ADJYLD 1 1 -.6907024 .1155854
EQUATION 2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5 SOILD
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 23
R**2 .54515445 RBAR**2 .46605088
SSR . 21877010E-05 SEE .30841114E-03
DURBIN-WATSON 2.29375258
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
* * * ******* * * * *** ************ ************
1 0 CONSTANT 0 0 -.2922824E-04 .5341303E-04
1 1 ADJIN 2 1 .1533603E-02 .9236408E-03
1 2 SOILD 5 1 .2906946 .1415196
13 CP 3 1 .2460635E-02 .4158935E-03
14 RACP 8 1 -.1049251E-04 .2582090E-04
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EQUATION 3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 3 CP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 19
R**2 .64520933 RBAR**2 .49582379
SSR .22704969 SEE .10931598
DURBIN--WATSON 2.36092495
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
* * * ******* *** ************ ************
15 CONSTANT 0 0 -. 1337338E-02 .1661672E-01
16 CP 3 1 -.3546329 .1238843
17 CP 3 2 -.1174124 .7308426E-01
18 RPOTPRI 7 0 .8468300E-02 . 1616031E-01
19 EP 10 0 .1001005 .2331844E-01
2 0 ADJIN 2 1 .9890538E-01 .2097053
2 1 RACP 8 1 -.8579304E-02 .4280367E-02
2 2 SOILD 5 1 -63.09982 27.53650
23 DEBT 12 1 -.7869099 .1714358
EQUATION 4
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1 0 EP
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1
OBSERVATIONS 28 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 25
R**2 .50342190 RBAR**2 .46369565
SSR 9.8585478 SEE .62796649
DURBIN-WATSON 2.22377057
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
* * *  * * * * * * *  * * *  * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * *
24 CONSTANT 0 0 -.2418484E-01 .1110374
25 RPOTPRI 7 0 -.8712473 .1331338
26 RPOTPRI 7 1 -.2877638 .1313874
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EQUATION 6
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 ADJIN 
FROM 1955- 1 UNTIL 1982- 1




NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT
*** ******* *** *** ************
27 CONSTANT 0 0 .1868245E-02
28 EP 1 0 - 1 .1257718E-01
29 EP 1 0 0 .7002835E-01
30 RINPRI 6 0 .2131494
31 RACP 8 0 -.6670007E-02
32 CP 3 0 -.7007371
33 SOILD 5 0 -23.10520















DEPENDENT VARIABLE 12 





NO. LABEL VAR LAG
* * *  * * * * * * *  * * *  ***
35 CONSTANT 0 0 -,
36 DEBT 12 1 -,
37 DEBT 12 2 -,
DEBT 
• 1
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